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ABSTRACT 
 
By 1936, the Guomindang had seemingly managed to secure its political dominance by 
nearly annihilating its main adversary, the Chinese Communist Party. In 1937, the Japanese army 
began a full-scale invasion of China that would forever change its political landscape. During the 
subsequent eight-year war, the Guomindang government collapsed, plagued by economic 
difficulties and internal corruption. Simultaneously, the small group of communists in Yan’an 
grew into a virulent force of opposition, with vast amounts of territory and the support of the 
masses. Nearly all components of this drastic turn of events can be linked to the imperialist 
expansion of Japan. This work seeks to analyze the specific ways in which the war of resistance 
against Japan resulted in the foundation of the People’s Republic of China; through the 
weakening of the Guomindang, the strategic benefits afforded the CCP, and the opportunity for 
the communists to achieve mass mobilization. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
FROM DYNASTIC RULE TO COMMUNISM 
 
For the first half of the twentieth century, China experienced a near constant state of 
chaos and struggle, enduring conflicts both domestic and international. By the late 1940s, China 
had undergone three radical revolutions, two international conflicts, and countless internal battles 
and rebellions. After decades of instability, fighting finally came to an end in 1949 as the 
nationalist government, under the leadership of the Guomindang (Kuomintang),1 fled to the 
island of Taiwan and the Chinese Communist Party founded the People’s Republic of China.2  In 
the short span of twelve years, this small, defeated group of communist rebels had grown to 
become the supreme government of a vast and populous nation.  
The rapid growth of the Chinese Communist Party during the 1930s can most reasonably 
be explained through an examination of external pressures that transformed the political 
landscape on the Chinese mainland. In 1937, Japan laid siege to Beijing, igniting the Second 
Sino-Japanese War. The subsequent eight years of Japanese aggression proved to be to the 
detriment of the nationalists, while lending great benefit to the communists. Japanese 
imperialism had a profound effect on the outcome of the Chinese Civil War fought 1946-1949, 
which resulted in communist victory and the formation of the People’s Republic of China. 
 
                                                
1 This paper uses the standard pinyin system of transliteration for all Chinese names and 
places.  Where other forms of transliteration may be more commonly recognized, parenthetical 
reference of the Wade-Giles transliteration is given with the first use of the name. 
 
 2 Paul J.  Bailey, China in the Twentieth Century (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 
2001) 149. 
 2 
The Origins of Civil War 
 The roots of Chinese communism can be seen as early as 1911, when a number of 
socialist activists participated in the Xinhai Revolution that resulted in the overthrow of the Qing 
dynasty. Following the establishment of the first Chinese republic in 1912, more than thirty 
known socialists became members of parliament. In the early years of the republic, Chinese 
socialists organized a political party, disseminating literature to intellectuals throughout the 
country. Though Yuan Shikai, the first president of the Republic of China, officially dissolved 
the party in August 1913, Chinese socialists continued secret propaganda campaigns contributing 
to the political demise of Yuan Shikai in 1916.3  
 From its inception, Chinese communism virulently opposed foreign imperialism, linking 
first world4 exploitation of weaker nations with the global bourgeoisie’s exploitation of the 
proletariat. As Chen Gongbo wrote in 1924, “Communism sprouts from the soil of foreign 
capitalism and imperialism.”5 Beginning with the Opium Wars of the mid nineteenth century that 
led to China’s loss of Hong Kong to Great Britain, western powers, along with Japan, repeatedly 
pillaged and exploited the middle kingdom.6 China lost influence over the Korean peninsula and 
the island of Taiwan through her defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War of 1895. As the Qing 
dynasty collapsed at the turn of the century, European powers seized a number of other 
concessions throughout eastern China. Foreign imperialism continued to plague China in the 
twentieth century. In 1915, Yuan Shikai agreed to a set of thirteen demands (originally twenty-
                                                
 3 Chen Gongbo, The Communist Movement in China, edited by C. Martin Wilbur (New 
York: Octagon Books, 1966) 74-78. 
 
 4 The “first world” collectively refers to industrialized, economically developed countries 
such as the United States, Great Britain, and Japan.  
 
 5 Ibid., 64. 
 
 6“Middle kingdom” is the direct translation for zhong guo, the Mandarin term for China.  
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one) of the Japanese prime minister, in an effort to postpone direct military conflict with 
technologically superior Japan. These concessions expanded Japanese economic influence 
throughout Manchuria and into Shandong. The Treaty of Versailles that brought an end to World 
War I redistributed German concessions in Shandong province to Japan, fueling anti-imperialist 
and anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese. By the late 1910s, foreign capitalists owned 
more than one third of all railways in China and maintained spheres of foreign influence 
throughout the mainland. 7  
In the early 1910s, the original President of the Republic of China, Yuan Shikai, 
dissolved the nationalist party and named himself emperor, attempting to establish a new 
dynasty.8 A number of Chinese provinces responded by declaring independence, with local 
warlords, particularly in the north, ruling sizeable areas of the mainland for nearly a decade. 
Outraged by Yuan’s betrayal of the republic, the revolutionary Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yatsen) 
reestablished the Guomindang in the southern province of Guangdong (Canton) and began 
organizing opposition to Yuan Shikai.  Following Yuan’s death by natural causes in 1916, the 
Guomindang continued to engage in civil war against various warlords in the north in an attempt 
to unite the mainland and restore the republic. Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kaishek), the eventual 
                                                
 7 Bailey, China in the Twentieth Century, 19-34, 75-87; see also Chen Gongbo, The 
Communist Movement in China, 64. 
 
8The “nationalist party” refers to the Guomindang (originally the Tongmenhui) organized 
by the revolutionary leader, Sun Zhongshan. The Guomindang was instrumental in the overthrow 
of the Qing dynasty and the formation of the Republic of China (1912-1949). The party 
continues to be a dominant political force in Taiwan.    
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Commander-in-Chief of the Guomindang, continued the efforts of Sun Zhongshan following 
Sun’s death in 1925.9 
On 4 May 1919, student protests broke out in Beijing against imperialism and the 
government’s concessions to foreign powers. From this student movement, a number of Marxist 
organizations emerged including the Young Socialist Group and the National Labor Union. 
Twelve delegates from socialist cells throughout China (and forty-one other attendees) gathered 
in Shanghai for two weeks beginning July 20, 1921. In response to what they believed to be the 
inescapable tendency of imperialist powers to control and exploit weaker nations, these delegates 
formed the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), calling for the emancipation of China from internal 
and external oppression through immediate social revolution. 10 
 Originally, the Chinese communists adopted a policy of non-compromise in their attitude 
toward rival political entities. The members declared that the party “recognizes social revolution 
as our chief policy; absolutely cuts off all relations with the yellow intellectual class, and other 
such parties.” After a year of growth and struggle, a number of changes were made in the 
policies of the CCP, most notably the willingness to cooperate with other political forces. With 
strong encouragement from the Communist International (Comintern) in Moscow, the CCP 
agreed to form an alliance with the Guomindang at the Second Conference of the Chinese 
Communist Party in July 1922.  The communists acknowledged commonalities between the two 
groups, including a mutual opposition to “capitalistic imperialism and of militarist and 
                                                
9 Sun Zhongshan, “Manifesto on the Restoration of the Provisional Constitution: June 9, 
1916,” in The Kuomintang: Selected Historical Documents 1894-1969, edited by Milton J. Shieh 
(St. John’s University Press, 1970) 59-62; Bailey, China in the Twentieth Century, 100-103. 
 
10 Chen Gongbo, The Communist Movement in China, 76-79; see also Hans J. Van de 
Ven, From Friend to Comrade: The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party 1920-1927 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991) 85-90; Bailey, China in the 
Twentieth Century, 93-95. 
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bureaucratic feudalism.11” In an alliance against warlords and imperialism, the CCP and 
Guomindang formed the First United Front. This alliance culminated in the Northern Expedition 
of 1926-27 that united eighty percent of the mainland under a central government in Nanjing.12 
 While successful in largely ridding China of warlords and establishing a central 
government, the Northern Expedition exposed internal conflicts within the Guomindang. As the 
territory and influence of the United Front grew, two clear factions emerged. The first, based in 
Wuhan, consisted of Wang Jingwei and the left wing of the Guomindang, along with members of 
the CCP. Those loyal to Jiang Jieshi comprised the second faction, containing the right wing of 
the Guomindang based in Nanchang. Aside from ideological differences, Jiang Jieshi and Wang 
Jingwei differed greatly in their treatment of the communists. CCP members enjoyed significant 
freedom under the party leadership in Wuhan, while Jiang Jieshi took a more dictatorial 
approach, closely supervising CCP members and supporters. Tensions between the two factions 
ignited the March 20th Incident of 1926, when an alleged assassination attempt on Jiang Jieshi 
led to arrests of more than twenty-five CCP members and their Soviet advisors at the Huangpu 
(Whampoa) Military Academy in Guangdong. The incident resulted in the Guomindang Central 
Executive Committee’s May 15 declaration that limited the number of CCP members in 
administrative positions and required review and approval for any CCP or Comintern 
directives.13   
                                                
11 “The First Program of the Communist Party of China 1921,” in Chen Gongbo, 102-
103; “The Manifesto of the Communist Party of China adopted in July 1922 by the Second 
Congress,” in Chen Gongbo, The Communist Movement in China, 115; see also Lee Feigon, 
Chen Duxiu: Founder of the Chinese Communist Party (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1983) 166-170; Bailey, 96-100. 
 
12 Bailey, China in the Twentieth Century, 100-110. 
 
13 Jacques Guillermaz, A History of the Chinese Communist Party 1921-1949, translated 
by Anne Destenay (New York: Random House, 1972) 99-101. 
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 Conflict between Wang Jingwei and Jiang Jieshi culminated in a full split of the 
Guomindang in 1927, with Jiang Jieshi and the right wing usurping power and initiating a purge 
of leftist elements from the party. The Central Supervisory Committee (excluding members from 
the local government of Wuhan) issued a dispatch to the Central Executive Committee of the 
Guomindang on April 10, 1927 containing a list of those “found to be responsible of treacherous 
activities” and calling for a “purifying of the party from communist elements.” On April 12, 
Jiang Jieshi moved to disarm pro-CCP labor unions in Shanghai, resulting in the deaths of three 
hundred communists with more than five thousand others displaced. Violence against 
communists and Wang Jingwei supporters continued in other cities, with more than 2,100 
arrested in Guangdong province.14  
 At the Fifth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held April 1927, the communist 
leader Chen Duxiu, in accordance with directives from the Comintern in Moscow, advocated an 
alliance with the leftist Guomindang government in Wuhan.15 Chen maintained that 
revolutionary ideas could be spread more effectively under the protection of a military union 
with Wang Jingwei. As Comintern representatives in Wuhan began pressuring the government to 
form an official alliance with the CCP, Wang Jingwei grew increasingly suspicious of the 
communists, fearing that CCP attempts to gain military power were aimed at a planned coup of 
the Wuhan government. Wang Jingwei also became vulnerable to encroaching warlords, 
                                                
14 “A Dispatch on the Need of Purifying the Party from Communist Elements,” April 10, 
1927, in The Kuomintang: Selected Historical Documents 1894-1969, edited by Milton Shieh 
(St. John’s University Press, 1970) 135-136; Guillermaz, A History of the Chinese Communist 
Party, 124-125. 
 
 15 By this time CCP membership had risen to nearly 58,000, with eighty delegates present 
at the conference; Official histories of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) assert that future 
PRC leaders Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi voiced opposition to Chen Duxiu’s so-called ‘rightist’ 
position at the Fifth Congress, but were quickly silenced.  
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particularly Feng Yuxiang. These external pressures motivated the Wuhan government to enter 
into an agreement with the Guomindang in Nanjing. To evade the wrath of Jiang Jieshi, Wang 
Jingwei escaped to Europe, while a number of other Wuhan officials fled to Japan. 16  As a first 
step toward rapprochement, all communists were expelled from areas under Wuhan’s influence. 
To escape persecution, the Chinese communists retreated to the countryside, initiating a major 
shift in ideology and strategy for the CCP.17  
 The reunified Guomindang government in Nanjing made the extermination of 
communism from China its primary goal. In October 1930, Jiang Jieshi began a series of five 
anti-communist military campaigns directed against rural bases that the CCP had established in 
border regions throughout southern and western China. The first three campaigns were directed 
against the primary base of the CCP leadership in the Jiangxi-Hunan-Guangdong border region 
in the south. Occurring over the span of one year, each of these three campaigns consisted of a 
significantly smaller communist army evading nationalist forces, with great aid from surrounding 
topography that made the Jiangxi border region relatively inaccessible to the Guomindang 
troops. In September 1931, the Guomindang was forced to turn its focus temporarily away from 
communist annihilation to address conflicts with Japan in Manchuria and Shanghai.18 
                                                
 16 Yuan Shikai’s general Feng Yuxiang converted to Methodism in 1914 and became a 
local warlord in present-day Hebei province following the collapse of Yuan’s government in 
1916. Often referred to as “The Christian General,” Feng reportedly baptized his troops with fire 
hoses and outlawed gambling and prostitution in territories under his control; Wang Jingwei 
eventually became the puppet leader of the Japanese collaborationist government in Shanghai 
during Japan’s occupation of eastern China, 1937-1945; Bailey, China in the Twentieth Century, 
107-109. 
 
 17 Guillermaz, 133-139; see also Shanti Swarup, A Study of the Chinese Communist 
Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966) 46-48, 72-105. 
 
 18 Ibid., 228-234.  
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 In 1932, after reaching an agreement with Japan that ended hostilities in Shanghai in the 
east, Jiang Jieshi returned to his goal of eradicating communism from China. The fourth anti-
communist campaign, beginning June 1932, was directed at communist forces in the Hunan-
Hubei-Anhui border region. With a force of 500,000 troops, nationalist forces attacked the fourth 
front army of the CCP, under the leadership of Zhang Guotao. Zhang’s army, with a mere 25,000 
troops, fled the border region and relocated to Sichuan province in the southwest where they 
awaited assistance from the first front army in Jiangxi.19  
 In the fifth and final anti-communist campaign, Jiang Jieshi sought to at last put an end to 
the nuisance of the CCP. All political, economic, and military resources were directed against the 
Chinese communists in this final campaign. Jiang Jieshi organized local militias and a secret 
police of 24,000 men to eliminate communist sympathizers within areas under nationalist 
control. Nationalist forces established strict blockades around communist zones, preventing all 
movement of traffic. With more than 800,000 ground troops and roughly one hundred aircraft, 
the Guomindang bombarded the communist base in Jiangxi province in October 1933. A 
defeated red army, under the leadership of Zhu De, managed to narrowly break through the 
nationalist blockade one year later, abandoning its base in Jiangxi and embarking on the epic 
Long March.20 
 At the onset of the Long March, fighting and desertions had reduced the number of 
communist soldiers by half. Leaving behind the elderly as well as most women and children, 
nearly 86,000 communists left Jiangxi in October 1934. As the first front army fled from 
                                                
 19 Zhang Guotao, The Rise of the Communist Party 1928-1938: Volume Two of the 
Autobiography of Chang Kuo-t’ao (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1972) 295-
296; see also Guillermaz, A History of the Chinese Communist Party,  234-235. 
 
 20 Guillermaz, A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 235-240. 
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nationalist forces moving west, equipment and supplies were often abandoned to increase 
mobility. CCP numbers continued to fall as they negotiated treacherous terrain, evading the 
pursuit of nationalist forces. To escape further conflict with Guomindang soldiers in the southern 
province of Guizhou, Zhu De’s forces turned northwest, taking a path that would ultimately lead 
them to Zhang Guotao’s fourth front army in northern Sichuan.21 
 Zhu De’s defeated army from Jiangxi met Zhang Guotao’s forces at Maokung in Sichuan 
province, where the weaknesses of the CCP became increasingly evident. Zhu De himself 
reportedly admitted a severe lack of discipline among the red army at this time, noting their 
tendency to waste many bullets in the killing of animals for food, due to poor marksmanship 
skills. As high-ranking communist officials met to discuss the future of the communist 
movement, internal political conflicts began to surface. Zhang Guotao expressed strong 
disagreement over strategy with Mao Zedong, the newly elected chairman of the CCP. The 
conflict ultimately resulted in a split of the already fragile communist party, with Zhang 
Guotao’s forces moving south and Mao Zedong’s first front army moving north toward Shanxi.22 
Those under Mao’s leadership pressed on with minimal food and supplies, through mountains 
and swamps, abandoning men and animals along the way. In October 1935, a mere 4,000 
communists arrived in rural Yan’an, Shanxi province to establish what would be the base of the 
                                                
21 Ibid., 253-255; Bailey, China in the Twentieth Century, 117-119.  
 
22 Various sources give differing accounts as to the specific events that led to the CCP 
split of 1935.  Zhang Guotao’s army met resistance from local minority groups and failed to 
establish a significant base in southern Sichuan; see Han Suyin, The Morning Deluge: Mao 
Tsetung and the Chinese Revolution 1893-1954 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972) 293-296; 
see also Zhang Guotao, 376-393; Guillermaz, A History of the Chinese Communisty Party, 259-
261. 
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CCP for the next decade.23 Twelve years later, this disorganized, defeated group of 
revolutionaries would gain full control of the Chinese mainland.  
  
Historiographic Context 
 The reason for the unlikely rise of the CCP has been a subject of debate among scholars 
of modern China for a number of years.  Some have cited the variance between policies and 
leadership abilities of Jiang Jieshi and Mao Zedong, while others have argued that communist 
victory was the result of foreign intervention. The secondary literature is primarily divided into 
works that attribute communist victory to the ineptitude of Jiang Jieshi, those that credit the 
appeal of Mao Zedong’s social revolution, and those that emphasize the impact of the Second 
Sino-Japanese War.24 
 A number of historians have placed blame for the defeat of the nationalists with the 
Guomindang Generalissimo, Jiang Jieshi.  Many prominent scholars of East Asia, such as John 
Fairbank and Lloyd Eastman, have argued that the ineffective policies of the nationalist 
government and the inept leadership of Jiang Jieshi were ultimately responsible for the 
Guomindang debacle of 1949.  According to these scholars, the Republic of China was plagued 
by internal corruption and poor military strategy that resulted in the total mismanagement of aid 
                                                
23 Bailey, China in the Twentieth Century, 118.  
 
24 Suzanne Pepper, “The Political Odyssey of an Intellectual Construct: Peasant 
Nationalism and the Study of China's Revolutionary History: A Review Essay,” The Journal of 
Asian Studies 63, no. 1 (Feb. 2004): 105-125.  
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received from western powers, leading to the government’s ultimate collapse.  Similar criticism 
of Jiang Jieshi can be seen in the writings of Parkes Coble.25  
In the 1960s, a school of thought emerged regarding the significance of the communist 
leader Mao Zedong on the outcome of the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949). The socialist 
philosophy of Mao Zedong, or Maoism, differed from Leninism in that it focused primarily on 
the rural peasantry instead of the urban proletariat, which was largely nonexistent in China at the 
time of the revolution. In 1964, Donald Gillin noted the appeal of Maoist ideology for the 
peasantry, which constituted eighty percent of the population at the time of the 1949 revolution. 
Gillin emphasized the popular support for social and economic reforms of the communist party. 
Mark Selden conducted a similar study that noted the ability of Maoist economic policies, such 
as reductions in land rent and interest rates, to meet the needs of rural farmers. Selden’s later 
research illustrated the significance of equitable tax policies introduced in communist controlled 
areas prior to the invasion of Japan. These scholars, along with George Taylor and Lucien 
Bianco, downplayed the significance of outside forces and argued that the foundations for 
communist victory were in place prior to the Sino-Japanese conflict. 26 
                                                
 25 John Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1983); Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule 1927-
1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974); Parkes Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese 
Politics and Japanese Imperialism 1931-1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1991). 
 
26 Donald Gillin, “Peasant Nationalism in the History of Chinese Communism,” Journal 
of Asian Studies 23, no.2 (1964): 269-89; Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); Mark Selden, China in Revolution: The 
Yenan Way Revisited (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995); Lucien Bianco, “Peasant Responses to 
CCP Mobilization Policies, 1937-1945,” New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist 
Revolution, eds. Tony Saich and Hans Van de Ven (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995); see also 
George Taylor, review of Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of 
Revolutionary China, 1937 – 1945, by Chalmers Johnson, American Historical Review 69 
(1963): 228-29. 
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In 1962, Chalmers Johnson presented the single most influential work concerning 
causality of communist victory. In stark contrast to earlier arguments, Johnson noted the 
significance of Japanese intervention above all other factors.  In his famous “peasant nationalism 
thesis,” Johnson argued that the Second Sino-Japanese War provided the opportunity for Mao 
Zedong to mobilize the peasantry against the Japanese imperialists and focus that support against 
the Guomindang following the defeat of Japan in 1945.  Prior to the Second United Front,27 the 
communists advocated resistance to Japanese aggression among rural farmers while Jiang Jieshi 
appeased the Japanese in order to continue his assault on the communist rebellion.  According to 
Johnson, the victory of the CCP was a direct result of its ability to foster rural-based popular 
resistance against Japan. The communist stance against Japanese brutality afforded them 
legitimacy from the rural masses.28 
Chong-Sik Lee, a renowned scholar of communism in Asia, blatantly and passionately 
affirmed Johnson’s “peasant nationalism” thesis. By giving several examples of failed attempts 
by local communist leaders to mobilize peasants in the 1920s, Lee challenged the arguments of 
those who credited pro-peasant policies for ultimate communist victory.  Lee, like his 
predecessor Johnson, argued that the Second Sino-Japanese War was the single most motivating 
factor for the embrace of communism by the masses. Several other notable historians, such as 
                                                
 27 The Second United Front was a fragile alliance formed between the CCP and the 
Guomindang in 1937, in response to the Japanese invasion. The pseudo-alliance collapsed with 
the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War in 1946.  
 
28 Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of 
Revolutionary China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962); see also Bailey, 150. 
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Joel Migdal and Selig Harrison, shared Lee’s ideas concerning the role of the war against Japan 
on peasant mobilization.29 
Recent decades have seen the emergence of a scholarship that accepts the indispensable 
role of Japanese aggression in the ultimate victory of communism in China, but questions 
Johnson’s thesis of “peasant nationalism.”  Contemporary historians have investigated other 
ways in which the war with Japan influenced the outcome of the Chinese Civil War.  Those who 
challenge Johnson’s idea of mass peasant mobilization have often explored anti-Japanese 
movements among other classes, as well as the impact of Japanese invasion on military strategy 
for both the communists and nationalists. 
Among the first to offer such an argument was Tetsuya Kataoka. While arguing that the 
conflict with Japan was the ultimate cause for communist victory, Kataoka placed greater 
emphasis on military strategy.  According to Kataoka, the Japanese invasion isolated the 
Guomindang from its urban-elite power base in the east.  The communists, now able to mobilize 
behind Japanese lines, avoided direct combat with the Guomindang.  Kataoka also noted that in 
addition to gaining support from the peasantry, the Japanese invasion allowed communist forces 
to gain influence with rural elites and local gentry. Similar to Kataoka, Carl Dorris and Odoric 
                                                
29 Chong-Sik Lee, Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and 
Soviet Interest, 1922-1945 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983);  
Joel Migdal, Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures Toward Political Change in the Third 
World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974); Selig Harrison, The Widening Gulf: 
Asian Nationalism and American Policy (New York: Free Press, 1978); see also Michael 
Underdown, review of Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and Soviet 
Interest, 1922-1945, by Chong-Sik Lee, Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 16 (July 1986): 
135-137. 
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Wou credited the war with causality, but saw “peasant nationalism” as part of a greater, anti-
Japanese movement that extended beyond class lines. 30 
A number of scholars of modern China have suggested the significance of Japanese 
aggression during the 1930s and 1940s in the weakening of the Guomindang.  Qi Xisheng noted 
the inability of the Guomindang to build support after the Japanese invasion forced the 
nationalists to relocate to Chongqing in the west, a region in which the Guomindang held 
minimal control.  Other historians, such as Wu Tianwei, Ramon Myers, and Thomas Metzger, 
emphasized the ways in which the Japanese invasion forced the Guomindang to turn its focus 
away from the activities of state-building in order to confront a superior military power. 31 
The case of China in the 1930s illustrates a set of circumstances that are conducive to 
socialist revolution. After centuries of autocratic rule and decades of unrest, China had become a 
land with a weak central government and competing political factions. A century of foreign 
exploitation culminated in the invasion of Japan, when a growing anti-imperialist sentiment 
merged with communist ideology to mobilize the masses for revolution.  The Second Sino-
Japanese War is of further significance due to its contribution to the triumph of Maoist ideology, 
which was later exported to revolutionary movements throughout the globe. 
                                                
30 Tetsuya Kataoka, Resistance and Revolution in China: The Communists and the 
Second United Front (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Carl E. Dorris, “Peasant 
Mobilization in North China and the Origins of Yenan Communism,” China Quarterly, no. 68 
(1976): 697-719; Odoric Wou, Mobilizing the Masses: Building Revolution in Henan (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1994). 
 
 31 Qi Xisheng, Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse 1937-45 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982); Wu Tianwei, The Xi’an Incident: A Pivotal 
Point in Modern Chinese History (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for Chinese 
Studies, 1976); R.H.  Myers and T.A.  Metzger, “Sinological Shadows: The State of Modern 
China Studies in the U.S.,” in Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 1980, 4: 1-34. 
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By 1936, the Guomindang had seemingly managed to secure its continued political 
dominance by nearly annihilating its main adversary, the Chinese Communist Party. In 1937, the 
Japanese army began a full-scale invasion of China that would forever change its political 
landscape. During the subsequent eight-year war, the Guomindang government collapsed, 
plagued by economic difficulties and internal corruption. Simultaneously, the small group of 
communists in Yan’an grew into a virulent force of opposition, with vast amounts of territory 
and the support of the masses. Nearly all components of this drastic turn of events can be linked 
to the imperialist expansion of Japan. As Mao Zedong himself stated to a visiting Japanese 
delegation in 1964, 
Had your imperial army not invaded more than half of China, the Chinese people would 
 not have been able to unite to oppose you, and the Chinese Communist Party would not 
 have been able to seize state power.32 
 
This work seeks to analyze the specific ways in which the war of resistance against Japan 
resulted in the foundation of the People’s Republic of China; through the weakening of the 
Guomindang, the strategic benefits afforded the CCP, and the opportunity for the communists to 
achieve mass mobilization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 32 Mao Zedong, “Discussion with Members of Japan’s Socialist Party,” July 10, 1964 in 
Long Live the Thought of Mao Zedong (N.p., 1969) 533. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
JAPAN’S WEAKENING OF THE GUOMINDANG 
 
 Prior to the Japanese invasion, the Republic of China enjoyed ten years of relative 
prosperity under the governance of the Guomindang (Kuomintang) or “nationalist party.”33 
Following the Northern Expedition of 1926-1927, the Guomindang, under the leadership of the 
Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai Shek), established a central government in the eastern 
city of Nanjing. Emerging from the political decay that followed the collapse of the Qing dynasty 
and the failure of Yuan Shikai’s government, the nationalist regime managed to establish a 
measure of stability throughout eastern China and maintain its dominance for a decade despite 
domestic opposition from residual warlords and a persistent communist insurgency.34  
 After ten years of Guomindang rule, the Lugouqiao or Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 
northern China on July 7, 1937 instigated the Japanese army’s invasion of the Republic of China 
and marked the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War.35 The subsequent eight years of 
                                                
 33 This chapter contains multiple references to the Guomindang, (originally the 
Tongmenhui) organized by the revolutionary leader, Sun Zhongshan. The Guomindang was 
instrumental in the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and the formation of the Republic of China 
(1912-1949). The party continues to be a dominant political force in Taiwan. All mentioning of 
the “republic” or “nationalist party” refers to this political entity. Also, all references to “China” 
or “Chinese,” unless otherwise specified, refer to the Guomindang, as it remained the official 
government of the republic into the 1940s. 
 
 34 Following the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, Yuan Shikai led a brief republican 
government that ultimately failed in 1917, after Yuan proclaimed himself emperor. No central 
government existed until the establishment of Jiang Jieshi’s Nanjing government in 1927. The 
Northern Expedition refers to the collaborative military campaign in which the CCP and 
Guomindang defeated local warlords in the east to unite eighty percent of the mainland under 
one central government. see Bailey, China in the Twentieth Century, 68-80. 
 
 35 Since 1931, Japan had occupied the three northeastern provinces of present-day China 
(collectively referred to as Manchuria) under the auspices of the puppet emperor of 
Manzhouguo, Pu Yi. On the night of July 7, Chinese soldiers responded with fire to an 
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fighting would result in the deaths of millions of Chinese people and dramatically alter the 
political landscape of the Chinese mainland.36 The invasion proved especially devastating for the 
Guomindang, which became the direct target of Japanese aggression in the early years of the 
war. As the Japanese Premier Konoye stated on December 22, 1938, the Japanese government 
resolved to carry out “military operations for the complete extermination of the anti-Japanese 
Guomindang government.”37 The war of resistance against Japan severely weakened the 
Guomindang’s authority and legitimacy in China, making Jiang Jieshi’s government vulnerable 
to growing domestic opposition in the late 1940s. The Japanese army served to isolate the 
Guomindang geographically, politically, and economically, facilitating its ultimate defeat at the 
hands of the communists in 1949. 
 
Geographic Isolation and the Weakening of the Military    
 The immediate consequence of the Japanese invasion was the geographic isolation 
imposed upon Jiang Jieshi’s government. Prior to 1937, Guomindang power was highly 
concentrated along the eastern coast. Eastern cities such as Nanjing (Nanking), Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou (Canton) were home to the largest numbers of Guomindang party members, and 
                                                
unannounced Japanese military training maneuver on the border of Manzhouguo and the 
Republic of China. The Japanese army used this event, referred to as the Marco Polo Bridge 
Incident, to justify its invasion and occupation of China, 1937-1945. See Bailey, China in the 
Twentieth Century, 120-143. 
 
 36 In 1978, the Guomindang government in Taiwan claimed to have sustained more than 
eight million casualties during the Second Sino-Japanese War. See He Yingqin, Who Actually 
Fought the Sino-Japanese War 1939-45 (Taipei, Taiwan: Lee Ming Company, Inc., 1979) 4-5. 
 
 37 Premier Konoye, “Statement by Premier Konoye December 22, 1938,” in Harold S. 
Quigley, Far Eastern War 1937-1941 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1942) 283. 
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served as bastions of nationalist influence amid a sea of rural disunity and regionalism.38 While 
the government of the republic had managed to gain nominal control over ten provinces during 
its ten years of dominance, its legitimacy was most securely established in the coastal provinces 
of Zheijiang and Jiangsu, which contained both of China’s major political and economic centers: 
Shanghai and the Guomindang capital, Nanjing.39 
 Following the siege of Beijing in July 1937, Guomindang military leaders attempted to 
predict Japanese strategy for the occupation of China. Most suspected that Japan would quickly 
overtake northern China (where Guomindang influence was nominal at best) and then expand 
southward. A previous agreement negotiated in 1932 between the expanding Japanese empire 
and the Republic of China had established a demilitarized zone around the coastal city of 
Shanghai. In August 1937, Jiang Jieshi moved forces into this demilitarized zone in an effort to 
provoke a Japanese attack, expediting the movement of Japanese troops into southern China 
where the Guomindang maintained greater influence. Claiming he would “drive the Japanese 
into the sea,” Jiang Jieshi utilized sixty percent of the republic’s total forces at Shanghai, battling 
the invading Japanese forces from the north and guarding the eastern coast from possible 
reinforcements. 40 The Guomindang managed to resist successfully the Japanese throughout 
October, but on November 5 the Japanese General Yanagawa landed on the Chinese coast at 
Qinshawei, south of Shanghai, with 30,000 troops. Japanese forces from the north and south 
                                                
 38 Dian Hongmao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China 1927-1937 (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1972) 180; 31-32.  
 
 39 While historians have questioned Jiang Jieshi’s motives for provoking the Japanese 
attack on Shanghai, it is likely that Jiang  intentionally provoked an attack on a major population 
center, hoping to expedite sympathy and monetary aid from the West; Ibid., 1-3.  
 
 40 See Qi Xisheng, Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse 
1937-1945 (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1982), 41-47. 
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marched toward each other, carving a path of destruction that resulted in the fall of Shanghai and 
the death of more than 300,000 Chinese soldiers and civilians.41 
 Following its victory at Shanghai, the Japanese army moved inland along the Chang 
Jiang (Yangtze River) to Nanjing (see Map 2.1). The exhaustion of Guomindang forces at 
Shanghai had left the city virtually undefended. As the Japanese army approached Nanjing in 
late November, the government of the republic was forced to abandon its capital. Fearing 
Japanese pursuit, the Guomindang Generalissimo chose to relocate the government to the far 
western city of Chongqing in remote Sichuan province.42 Nanjing fell to the Japanese in a mere 
five days, as Chinese soldiers fled west along the Chang Jiang to Wuhan.43 Six months after the 
initial invasion, the Guomindang had sustained more than 450,000 casualties and had been 
forced to abandon its major centers of culture, commerce, and political power.44 
 The last remaining industrial city of the Chinese republic lay at Wuhan.45 Before moving 
into Wuhan in 1938, the Japanese strategically captured the city of Guangzhou (Canton) in the 
far south through which seventy-five percent of all Chinese imports had passed following the fall 
                                                
 41 Ibid., 45.   
 
 42 Like Nanjing, Shanghai, and Wuhan, Chongqing is also located on the Chang Jiang 
(Yangtze River). At the time of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Chongqing was part of the vast 
province of Sichuan, which has since been divided by the government of the People’s Republic 
of China into Sichuan province and the Chongqing municipality.   
 
 43 Though briefly mentioned in the body of this text, the battle of Nanjing, commonly 
referred to as “The Rape of Nanking” is perhaps the most infamous display of Japanese 
aggression during the second world war. It is estimated that the Japanese army killed nearly 
200,000 Chinese civilians in less than one week, with countless others raped and wounded. See 
Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (New York: 
BasicBooks, 1997). 
 
 44 Qi Xisheng, Nationalist China at War, 45. 
 
 45 Like Nanjing and Shanghai, Wuhan lies on the Chang Jiang (Yangtze River). Wuhan is 
to the southwest of Nanjing and is the capital of Hubei province. (see map)  
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of Shanghai one year earlier. With Guangdong, the Japanese also captured the railroad leading to 
Kowloon in British Hong Kong, preventing the flow of arms from western countries to the 
dramatically weakened Guomindang. Cut off from its only remaining route to the sea, the 
Guomindang surrendered Wuhan to the Japanese October 25, 1938. Fifteen months after the 
outbreak of war, the Guomindang had surrendered all of its urban centers, losing control of the 
vital Chang Jiang and all access to the sea.46  
 Although the Guomindang government had been pushed into the far west as early as 
1938, armed skirmishes continued along Japanese lines into the early 1940s as Japan became 
preoccupied with its efforts in Manzhouguo and Southeast Asia.47 Threatened by allied forces in 
the Pacific, Japan recognized the need to connect its territory and consolidate its power over 
China and Indochina. In an effort to connect a continental railroad linking Japanese territories in 
Korea, eastern China, and Vietnam, the Japanese began Operation Ichigo in spring 1944.  The 
campaign squelched any hope of formidable Guomindang resistance, resulting in the death or 
disbanding of nearly 750,000 Chinese troops. As Guomindang soldiers fled into the west to 
avoid the rapidly approaching Japanese army, they were forced to abandon valuable arms, with 
an estimated 23,000 tons of weapons and ammunition lost during Operation Ichigo alone. As the 
Japanese forces pushed south, they also gained control of Hunan province, a vital rice-producing 
region essential for feeding nationalist China in the west.48 
 
 
 
                                                
 46 Qi Xisheng, Nationalist China at War, 52-59.  
 
 47 Manzhouguo (Manchukuo) is the name given to the Japanese puppet state established 
under the emperor Pu Yi in Manchuria. See Prasenjit Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: 
Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
2003). 
 48 Qi Xisheng, Nationalist China at War, 75-80;  
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Map 2.1. Ichigo Plan 
  
Source: Ibiblio: The Public’s Library and Digital Archive, “The U.S. Army Campaigns of World 
War II: The China Defensive, (map),” http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-C-
ChinaD/maps/USA-C-ChinaD-3.jpg (accessed 28 January 2010). 
*The map depicting Operation Ichigo uses the older, Wade-Giles system of transliteration for the 
names of Chinese cities, while this paper primarily uses the newer, pinyin system. As a result, 
the spelling of the names of some cities on the map, such as Chongqing (Chungking), Beijing 
(Peiping) and Guilin (Kweilin), differs from the spelling in the text. 
 
By the end of the war in 1945, Japan had dramatically weakened the Guomindang army. 
Beyond the loss of life and weaponry, the loss of territory proved especially devastating for the 
Guomindang when tensions with the communists, who had gained influence and territory in the 
east, escalated to civil war in 1946. Cut off from ports, urban centers, food-producing regions, 
and the majority of the Chinese population, the Guomindang’s geographic isolation during the 
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Second Sino-Japanese War contributed to the weakening of the nationalist government 
politically and economically.  
 
Diplomatic Isolation and the Loss of Political Capital  
 Japan’s invasion also had significant diplomatic and political consequences for the 
Republic of China. After the brutal defeat at Shanghai, Jiang Jieshi and his wife, Jiang Song 
Meiling, pleaded with western powers for monetary and military aid.49 Japan’s demonstration of 
its aggression and military might in Manchuria and eastern China prevented a number of western 
powers from coming to China’s aid. Fearing the reaction of the powerful and aggressive 
Japanese military, Great Britain initially refrained from aiding the Guomindang government, 
hoping to protect its colonies in Hong Kong and Singapore. On January 4, 1938, Great Britain 
finally agreed to the construction of a route allowing the transport of supplies through Burma 
into China, but continued to deny Jiang Jieshi’s multiple requests for monetary loans, fearing it 
would ignite direct conflict with Japan. Other member states of the League of Nations, while 
expressing sympathy toward the Republic of China, also feared Japanese aggression. In an 
attempt to appease the Guomindang government, the League of Nations issued an ambiguous 
resolution on 20 January 1939, that asked member states to “refrain from taking any action 
which might have the effect of weakening China’s power of resistance and thus of increasing her 
difficulties in the present conflict,” but stopped short of asking states to send direct aid to 
China.50 
                                                
 49 Wang Zhonghui, “China’s Foreign Relations During the Sino-Japanese Hostilities 
1937-1940,” in Jiang Song Meiling, ed., China Shall Rise Again (New York: Harper and 
Brothers Publishers, 1941) 118-125. 
 
 50 “Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations adopted January 20, 1939,” in 
Harold S. Quigley, Far Eastern War 1937-1941, 329-330; see also Bradford A. Lee, Britain and 
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 The Second Sino-Japanese War also brought about a dramatic loss of political capital for 
the Guomindang. While rural peasants in the interior accounted for the vast majority of the 
Chinese population, the Guomindang government’s primary base of support consisted of 
capitalist elites in urban centers along the eastern coast. The fifteen-year gap between the fall of 
the Qing dynasty and the establishment of the Nanjing government had created a power vacuum 
in China that had given rise to a number of local warlords, concentrated in the north and west 
(see Map 2.2). The prolonged instability of the Chinese state in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries replaced any previous sense of national identity with regionalism, with many 
Chinese maintaining stronger allegiances to regional authorities than to the newly formed central 
government in Nanjing. As a result, the Guomindang was able only to establish firm control over 
two coastal provinces during the Nanjing decade (1927-1937): Zheijiang and Jiangsu (containing 
both Shanghai and Nanjing).51 
The blatant lack of a shared national identity throughout the provinces compelled the 
Guomindang to become heavily militarized in the 1920s. Recognizing the disunity of the 
Chinese people, Jiang Jieshi instituted a period of “political tutelage” in which provinces were 
pressured to remain loyal to the Guomindang through military force.52 
 
 
                                                
the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1939: A Study in the Dilemmas of British Decline (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1973) 85-87. 
 
51 Qi Xisheng, Nationalist China at War, 141; Guomindang Bureau of Statistics, Chung-
kuo Guomindang tang-wu t’ung-chi chi-yao (Nanjing, ROC: 1944) 1; Dian Hongmao, 
Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1-5. 
 
 52 Jiang Jieshi, “China’s March Toward Democracy,” address given to the Third Session 
of the People’s Political Council, Chongqing, February 21, 1939, in Resistance and 
Reconstruction: Messages During China’s Six Years of War 1937-1943 (Freeport, NY: Books 
for Libraries Press, 1943) 84-86. 
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Map 2.2. Nationalist China, 1928-1937 
  
Source: Robert A, Lynn, ed., “Nationalist China 1928-1937 (Map)” at Orders of Battle (Ravi 
Rikhye, 2006) http://orbat.com/site/maps/historical/chine%20civil%20war% 
20usma/chinese%20civil%20war%20map%2002.jpg (accessed  January 25, 2010). This map 
illustrates the contrast between the small area of firm Guomindang control along the eastern 
coast, and the larger territories of semi-autonomous warlords in the interior. 
 
 While Jiang maintained that this period of military rule was a temporary step on the road 
toward democracy, the actions of the Guomindang regime suggested a movement toward 
fascism, with little evidence of intent for democratization.53 The Guomindang leadership 
                                                
 53 The period of “political tutelage” often referred to in the writings of Jiang Jieshi was 
allegedly based on Sun Zhongshan’s “Three Principles of the People” (San min chu) and used as 
justification for the lack of democratic reform during the Nanjing decade (1927-1937). The 
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maintained that “without self-defense, self-government cannot be developed.” 54 Consumed with 
consolidating his power and increasing the amount of territory under Guomindang influence, 
Jiang Jieshi failed to create any true sense of legitimacy among the Chinese population in the 
1920s-1930s. When the Japanese army invaded in 1937 and brought about a rapid and severe 
weakening of the Guomindang military, Jiang Jieshi lost his only method of maintaining the 
allegiance of the masses. The absence of Guomindang military presence throughout the 
provinces allowed for the rise of a more organic nationalist movement in the 1940s under the 
leadership of the CCP.55  
 The forced relocation of the nationalist government to western Chongqing also had 
significant political consequences. In the late 1930s, the Guomindang had little control over 
Sichuan province, with virtually no significant influence in the neighboring provinces of Qinghai 
or Xikang.56 The southwestern region of China remained the major center of feudal warlordism 
into the 1930s. Power struggles between local militarists had prevented any socioeconomic 
growth within the region, with more than 470 armed conflicts between various warlords 
                                                
generalissimo argued that China must first be securely united under a strong (ultimately 
dictatorial) central government before opposition voices could be tolerated. This philosophy of 
governance differed greatly from communist policies of political participation and peasant 
mobilization in the Jiangxi Soviet (1927-1934) and during the Yan’an years (1934-1949). See 
Jiang Jieshi “China’s March Toward Democracy,” address given to the Third Session of the 
People’s Political Council, Chongqing, February 21, 1939, in Resistance and Reconstruction, 84-
86. See also Bailey, China in the Twentieth Century, 110. 
 
 54 C.E. Gauss, “The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State,” Chongqing, 
March 27, 1944, in Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1944, China, 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957) 385; “The Manifesto of the Extraordinary 
National Congress of the Kuomintang April 1, 1938,” in The Kuomintang: Selected Historical 
Documents 1894-1969, edited by Milton J. T. Shieh (New York: St. John’s University Center for 
Asian Studies, 1970) 177-182. 
  
 55 Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, 24-25. 
 
 56 The province of Xikang no longer exists in the present People’s Republic of China. Its 
territory is included in the Tibet (Xizang) Autonomous Region. 
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occurring between 1911 and 1938.57 Preoccupied with resisting the Japanese invasion (and later 
the growing communist movement) in the east, the Guomindang was unable to assert its 
dominance over the region surrounding its new capital. The city of Chengdu, also in Sichuan 
province, became the center of anti-government militarism in the 1940s, where warlords 
reportedly captured and hoarded food supplies, contributing to inflation and the continued 
weakening of the Guomindang regime.58 
 In addition to forcing the nationalist government into the territory of militant warlords, 
the Japanese invasion separated the Guomindang from the majority of the Chinese population, 
including its main base of support in eastern urban centers. In 1943, American diplomats in 
China noted the devastation to Guomindang political power in central and eastern China, as areas 
behind Japanese lines fell under the influence of collaborationist regimes or the CCP.59 By June 
1940, the Guomindang government had lost nearly 30,000 kilometers of long-distance telephone 
lines (half the total at the outbreak of war) further cementing its isolation from eastern China.60    
 While claiming to have united with the CCP in a shared defense of China against the 
Japanese, Jiang Jieshi initiated a blockade of communist controlled areas in northwestern China, 
                                                
 57 American Office of Strategic Service (OSS) Memo, February 1945 in Amerasia 
Papers, vol. 2, no. 259, 1359-1363. 
 
 58 Qi Xisheng, Nationalist China at War, 143-146. 
 
 59 Collaborationist regimes were cooperative governments organized by the Japanese 
with Chinese puppet leaders in urban centers, such as the Wang Jingwei collaborationist regime 
in Nanjing. The CCP established local governments in rural areas behind Japanese lines, as will 
be discussed in later chapters of this work; John Service, “Memorandum by the Third Secretary 
of Embassy in China (Service), Temporarily in the United States,” January 23, 1943 in Foreign 
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China, (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1957) 193-195. 
 
 60 Zhang Kia-ngau, “Free China’s Reconstruction Work in the Field of 
Communications,” in China Shall Rise Again, edited by Jiang Song Meiling (New York: Harper 
and Brothers Publishers, 1941) 163. 
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preventing travel or trade between Yan’an and Chongqing.61 Foreign journalists and military 
personnel were not permitted to pass the blockade (per restrictions imposed by Jiang) and the 
Guomindang broke radio communication with the communists to the north on January 14, 1944. 
While hoping to protect Guomindang controlled areas in the west from communist influence, this 
block of communication further contributed to the diplomatic and political isolation of the 
Guomindang, enraging foreign diplomats as well as Chinese peasants suffering in the east.62 
 Entries found in the diary of British journalist, Robert Payne, emphasized the political 
devastation for the Guomindang in eastern and central China as a result of the war with Japan.  
Payne, who traveled throughout China during the years of the Japanese occupation, criticized the 
actions of Jiang Jieshi, claiming that he was a leader disconnected from the majority of the 
Chinese people.  Payne argued that Jiang Jieshi’s isolation from soldiers and peasants during the 
war with Japan caused the Chinese people to lose confidence in the Generalissimo.  Payne’s 
assertions claimed to reflect the attitudes of people living in central and eastern China, arguing 
that peasants were unforgiving of a government that seemed to have abandoned them.  In 
contrast to statements made about the Guomindang, the diary argued that messages from the 
communist leadership resonated with the masses, partly because of the communication facilitated 
by the proximity of Yan’an, the communist capital, to peasants living in the interior.  Payne’s 
                                                
 61 Yan’an, in the northwestern province of Shaanxi, housed the headquarters of the CCP 
from the end of the Long March in 1935 throughout the era of the Second Sino-Japanese War. 
 
 62 C.E. Gauss, “The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State,” Chongqing, 
January 18, 1944, in Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, China, 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957) 309-310.  
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diary affirmed the apparent loss of legitimacy for the nationalist government as a result of its 
geographic isolation during the war with Japan.63 
 As Japan further threatened Jiang Jieshi’s power by decreasing the Guomindang’s 
territory, legitimacy, and military might, the Generalissimo became increasingly fearful and 
dictatorial. In 1938, Jiang outlawed a number of mass political organizations and dismissed the 
republic’s National Assembly, which eliminated political participation in areas under 
Guomindang control.64 To combat growing domestic opposition, the Guomindang employed a 
force of secret police to seek out and persecute dissidents in areas under its influence.65 
 These actions by the Guomindang regime outraged students and leftists who had once 
been loyal to the republican government. As a result, intellectuals left the Guomindang en masse 
during the latter years of the Second Sino-Japanese War.66 Feeling that Jiang had betrayed the 
republic and hopes for democracy, students, writers, and professors began publicly criticizing 
Jiang Jieshi. In a February 1944 speech, Dr. Sun Fo of the Central Training Corps gave a speech 
claiming that the Guomindang had “forgotten the very substance and method of 
                                                
 63 Robert Payne, Chinese Diaries 1941-1946 (New York: Waybright and Talley, 1970) 
232-233.  
 
 64 “A Review of Kuomintang-Communist Relations 1921-1944,” in Foreign Relations of 
the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, China, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1957) 51-57.  
 
 65 John Service, “Memorandum by the Third Secretary of Embassy in China (Service) 
Temporarily in the United States,” Washington, D.C., January 23, 1943 in Foreign Relations of 
the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1957) 193-195.  
 
66 Ibid., 193-195. 
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democracy…assumed the attitude and habits of a ruling-caste and [had] come to regard itself as 
the sovereign power entitled to a special position and to suppression of all criticism.”67  
 The increasingly dictatorial tendencies of the Guomindang regime, as it struggled to 
recover from the devastation brought about by the Japanese invasion, also created tensions with 
western powers, specifically the United States. American diplomats in China during the war 
expressed great frustration at Jiang Jieshi’s insistence on attacking political dissidents instead of 
focusing primarily on resisting Japan. On January 23, 1943, American diplomat John Service 
wrote that Jiang had begun turning his military focus away from Japan to eliminate communism, 
employing secret police throughout the provinces and using vital military resources to prepare 
for an offensive against communist strongholds in Hebei province.68 Tensions between western 
diplomats and Jiang Jieshi escalated into 1945, when the former U.S. Ambassador to China, C. 
E. Gauss, predicted that the CCP would win the inevitable civil war due to the fact that foreign 
powers could not give the Guomindang enough aid to compensate for the profound weaknesses 
in Jiang Jieshi’s government.69 While some scholars have argued that such examples suggest that 
Jiang Jieshi’s ineptitude was the ultimate reason for the defeat of the Guomindang, a broader 
examination of preceding events shows that Jiang’s move toward fascism in the early 1940s was 
                                                
 67 Dr. Sun Fo, “Democratization of the Government and Planned Economy,” February 
23, 1944 in Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, China, 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957) 385.  
 
 68John Service, “Memorandum by the Third Secretary of Embassy in China (Service), 
Temporarily in the United States,” January 23, 1943 in Foreign Relations of the United States: 
Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957) 193-199. 
 
 69 C.E. Gauss,  “The Ambassadorship of Major General Patrick J. Hurley 1944-1945,” in 
Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, China (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1957) 64-68. 
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a reaction to the dramatic weakening of his political power as a direct result of the Japanese 
invasion.70 
 
Economic Consequences of the War 
 In addition to weakening the Guomindang through geographic and political isolation, the 
Second Sino-Japanese War also proved exceptionally destructive to the economy of the Republic 
of China.  The Japanese invasion imposed a tremendous financial strain on the Guomindang 
government, with an estimated 100 billion Chinese yuan spent in military expenditures and 
another 36 billion U.S. dollars lost in the destruction of property.71 As the threat of Japanese 
militarism in the Pacific made other nations initially hesitant to come to China’s aid, the 
Guomindang government was forced to bear the cost of resistance alone in the early months of 
the war. Funding the resistance proved especially difficult to a government far removed from its 
primary sources of revenue. The Japanese invasion separated the Guomindang from major 
population centers in the east, rendering the government powerless to collect taxes from wealthy 
urban capitalists. With little administrative control over underdeveloped western provinces, the 
Guomindang was unable to produce necessary revenue to independently fund its military 
efforts.72 
 Beyond military costs, the Japanese invasion also robbed China of a number of its most 
resource rich provinces. Statements by both Chinese and Japanese officials illustrate Japan’s 
                                                
 70 See Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule 1927-
1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974); see also Parkes Coble, Facing Japan: 
Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism 1931-1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1991). 
 
 71 He Yingqin, Who Actually Fought the Sino-Japanese War 1939-1945, 4.  
 
 72 H. H. Kong, “Holding China’s Financial Front,” in China Shall Rise Again, edited by 
Jiang Song Meiling (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1941) 73. 
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desire to gain access to raw materials in China, which were vital to Japanese industry.73 
Agricultural products from northeastern regions, once essential to the subsistence of the Chinese 
people, fell under Japanese control as Guomindang forces were pushed into the west. Minerals 
crucial for industrialization, such as coal and iron, were also concentrated in areas under 
Japanese control.  In a plea for foreign aid, a report issued by the Guomindang in 1938 
concluded that without these resource-rich provinces all of China would perish. Recognizing the 
important role of economics in successful resistance, the report concluded, “In the end, the loss 
of economic freedom will bring about the extinction of our nation.”74  
 The scarcity of food and resources outside of Japanese territory caused dramatic inflation 
in western China during the war. By 1943, the prices of food staples in Sichuan province were 
reportedly increasing at the rate of ten percent per week. From June 1 to July 6 of that year, the 
price of rice in Chengdu doubled, sparking anti-Guomindang rebellions and exacerbating the 
government’s political difficulties in the region. American diplomats in Chongqing in the 1940s 
reported that prices in the capital were often 100 times higher than those before the Japanese 
invasion, with prices in the southern city of Kunming often reaching 200 times those of the pre-
war era. As prices continued to rise, middle-class supporters of the Guomindang in Chongqing 
became increasingly impoverished, compounding the government’s loss of political capital.75 
                                                
 73 Jiang Jieshi, “Statement by General Chiang Kaishek 26 December 1938,” in Quigley, 
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 Japan also contributed to the devastation of the Chinese economy by smuggling and 
purchasing goods from unoccupied territories, bringing them into areas under Japanese control. 
In 1943, employees of the Bank of China in Guilin claimed that Japanese spies used large 
amounts of counterfeit Chinese currency to purchase goods in Guomindang China. 76 Reportedly 
having acquired the plates necessary for printing the currency during the battle of Hong Kong in 
1941, the Japanese flooded unoccupied China with false currency, through the purchase of 
“strategic materials.” Such actions proved doubly devastating to the republic’s economy, 
creating an increased supply of money while simultaneously draining China of goods.77  
 While the Japanese contributed heavily to dramatic inflation in Guomindang areas during 
the 1940s, Jiang Jieshi’s actions aggravated the weaknesses of the Chinese economy. Instead of 
addressing smuggling and trade along border regions between occupied and unoccupied China, 
Jiang focused a great deal of resources on blockading the CCP to the north. While Jiang Jieshi 
failed to address the causes of inflation along the border of Japanese territory, the Guomindang 
leader requested and received some $700 million in aid from the United States, hoping to combat 
inflation and stabilize the economy. In 1944, Jiang Jieshi sent a letter to U.S. President Roosevelt 
demanding more monetary aid to address inflation, threatening to withdraw support of American 
troops in China if his demands were not met. When confronted with the advice of economists, 
Jiang maintained that American economists did not understand the Chinese economy. By 1944, 
however, the weaknesses in the Chinese economy were so profound that U.S. Ambassador to 
China, C.E. Gauss claimed, “No amount of American money in the United States to the credit of 
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China could remedy China’s financial and economic situation any more than if the whole of our 
machine gun output were hypothecated to China and remained in the United States.”78 
 The Guomindang’s geographic and diplomatic isolation contributed further to its 
economic collapse. The relocation of the capital to western Chongqing placed the Guomindang 
in a region that contained virtually no modern industry, forcing the nationalist government to 
attempt to industrialize western China while engaging in a military conflict with the Japanese in 
the east. Limited routes for the transportation of goods made this industrialization significantly 
more difficult. In 1940, Dr. Wang Zhonghui, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of 
China, noted obstructions to trade as a result of a Franco-Japanese agreement that ended all 
traffic between China and the outside world via Indochina. Other Guomindang officials 
emphasized the devastating impact of the closing of the Burma Road constructed by the British 
in 1938.79  According to the Guomindang Minister of Industrial Reorganization, the loss of this 
trade route left the government in Chongqing completely isolated from the world except for a 
few small supply routes through Russia.  Wang claimed that it would have been better to 
sacrifice a province of China than to lose this strategic connection with the outside world, 
arguing that the government was now faced with the reality of  “limited means and a dark 
economic future.”80  
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Conclusion 
 By 1945, the once stable government of the Republic of China lay in ruins. As the 
Japanese army forced the Guomindang to abandon its territory and weaponry, it weakened a 
regime whose political dominance had been maintained solely through military strength. The 
destruction of the Guomindang military and the retreat of Jiang Jieshi into the remote west 
created a power vacuum in the east that gave rise to a more authentic, rural-based nationalist 
movement. Abandoned by their government and suffering at the hands of the Japanese military, 
the Chinese masses became increasingly receptive to communist messages of national salvation. 
With the absence of Guomindang presence in the north and east, the CCP presented itself as the 
alternative to Japanese collaboration. Following the withdrawal of Japanese forces in 1945, the 
Guomindang regime found itself unable to recover from the political and economic damage it 
endured at the hands of the Japanese. With few resources or political support, Jiang Jieshi lacked 
the tools necessary for the salvation of his government from organized communist opposition. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
COMMUNIST EXPANSION BEHIND JAPANESE LINES 
 
 In the 1930s, Jiang Jieshi sought to eliminate the communist insurgency that threatened 
the stability of his regime. Following a series of five anti-communist military campaigns, the 
Chinese Communist Party abandoned its base in southern China and embarked on the epic Long 
March to the north. As a result of the Guomindang’s relentless efforts at annihilation, by the time 
of the Japanese invasion, the CCP had been reduced to a small, disorganized group of rebels, 
pushed into rural exile in one of the most impoverished regions of northern China. With the 
increasingly evident threat of Japanese invasion, the leadership of the CCP attempted to make 
amends with their pursuers through a proposed mutual resistance of Japan. In 1937, the CCP 
issued a resolution in favor of a second united front, calling for cooperation between the 
communists and the Guomindang based on the need for national salvation from the threat of 
Japan.81 
 Despite the initial alliance between the communists and nationalists, The Second Sino-
Japanese War impacted the Guomindang and the CCP in very different ways. The war 
bankrupted the Guomindang government, dramatically weakening its military and political 
influence. In contrast, the Japanese invasion had a significantly positive impact on the CCP. 
With Jiang Jieshi forced to address the foreign invaders, the communists were given a respite 
                                                
 81 The first united front occurred in the 1920s, when the CCP and Guomindang formed an 
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from the violent attacks that had threatened to annihilate them in the 1930s. As Japan pursued 
direct military battles with Guomindang armies, the CCP was able to orchestrate guerilla attacks 
at the enemy’s flanks and rear, organizing resistance behind Japanese lines that would later be 
mobilized against the Guomindang during the subsequent Chinese Civil War of 1946-1949. By 
1945, the Guomindang was dramatically weakened, forced to wait in western China for the other 
allies to defeat Japan, while the CCP was expanding its territory and influence in the east. The 
Japanese invasion separated the two rival political parties, protecting the struggling CCP, giving 
the communists the opportunity to expand their territory, influence and military with minimal 
interference from the Guomindang.82 
 
Expansion of Communist Territory 
 The Japanese invasion significantly aided the CCP’s efforts to increase the amount of 
territory under its control. This expansion was not merely a de facto result of the Japanese 
invasion but a calculated move on the part of the CCP.  Aware of the opportunities afforded them 
by Japan, the leadership of the CCP often spoke of their ultimate goal of a new central 
government in China. The communist leader Mao Zedong called for party leadership to “expand 
armed forces freely and independently, set up base areas unhesitatingly…and build up united 
front organs of political power under the leadership of the CCP.”83 The communists’ route of 
escape from Jiang Jieshi’s military campaigns in the 1930s took them to rural Yan’an in the 
northern province of Shaanxi. As Japan threatened military invasion and forced Jiang Jieshi to 
address international concerns, the communists sought first to establish a secure base in Yan’an, 
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and then to expand gradually their influence outward through Shaanxi and into neighboring 
provinces. This strategy was largely successful in that it filled the power vacuum created in the 
east by the Guomindang’s retreat into western China in 1937 (see Map 3.1).84 
  The CCP’s strategy of territorial expansion during the war tended to mimic that of the 
invading Japanese army. Like the Japanese, the CCP sought to establish a strong base in northern 
China, then expand to the south, eventually moving westward during the civil war 1946-49. 
Expanding behind Japanese lines, the CCP gained significant pieces of territory throughout 
eastern China during the war. The communists established base areas in three distinct areas: The 
Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border region in northern China; Hebei, Shandong, and Anhui in central 
China; and Jiangxi in southern China.85 The fact that CCP expansion mirrored that of the 
Japanese invasion illustrates the thoughtful planning of the communists and the significance of 
the war for the growth of the CCP.   
 A number of scholars, including Chalmers Johnson, have seen the beginnings of the 
communist revolution as a grassroots peasant movement later harnessed by the CCP.86 As the 
Japanese army threatened villages throughout China, a number of peasants began fighting back 
through roughly organized, ill-equipped groups orchestrating guerilla-style warfare against the 
Japanese. Communist expansion during the war was largely accomplished through the 
consolidation of these small guerilla units who were given training, arms, and organization by 
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the CCP. Abandoned by the central government and seeking a way to resist the Japanese army, 
peasants behind Japanese lines increasingly gave their loyalty to the CCP. As a result, the CCP 
greatly increased its presence throughout interior provinces. By the mid 1940s, the Japanese 
military noted the significant territorial expansion of the communist Eighth Route Army in 
northern China.87  By March 1945, the CCP administered nineteen small guerilla zones and 
controlled 535 miles of coastline.88  
 
Expansion of Communist Influence 
 In addition to dramatically increasing its territory, the CCP gained valuable political 
influence over the Chinese masses during the period of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The 
Japanese established puppet governments or “collaborationist” regimes in eastern urban centers, 
with administrative seats filled by Chinese defectors, such as the Wang Jingwei collaborationist 
government in Nanjing. With the lack of Guomindang political presence in the east, the Chinese 
masses were forced to choose between collaborating with the Japanese or cooperating with the 
communists in resisting foreign invasion. While collaborationist governments were primarily 
centered on major cities, such as Nanjing or Beijing, the CCP sought to organize local 
governments in rural areas, where the majority of the Chinese population resided.  By the late 
1930s, three Chinas existed: the Guomindang and warlord-controlled areas in the West, 
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Japanese-collaborationist regimes in eastern cities, and communist-controlled areas behind 
Japanese lines in rural central and eastern China.89 
Map 3.1. The Situation at the End of World War II. 
 
Source:  Robert A, Lynn, ed., “The Situation at the End of WWII (Map)” at Orders of Battle 
(Ravi Rikhye, 2006)http://orbat.com/site/maps/historical/ chine%20civil%2 0war 
%20usma/chinese%20civil%20war%20map%2002.jpg (accessed February 23, 2010).  
   
 The spread of communist-led local governments behind Japanese lines clearly illustrates 
the expansion of CCP influence during the war.  In May 1938, Mao Zedong proclaimed the 
establishment of the Shanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region government, illustrating that 
communist influence in the region surpassed that of the Guomindang a mere ten months after the 
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initial Japanese invasion.90 This move by the CCP can be seen as a first step toward the 
consolidation of its power in the north.91 The organization of a communist-led government 
spanning territory from three provinces was a significant move foreshadowing the eventual 
communist dominance of China. The establishment of such local governments would not have 
been possible without the Japanese invasion, strongly suggesting the significance of the Second 
Sino-Japanese War for the CCP.  
 From its organization in 1938, the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border region in the north 
served as a base from which the CCP expanded its influence. In the late 1930s, the communist 
leaders in this border region began forming “organs of anti-Japanese democratic power in 
northern and central China.” In 1940, the CCP established the Hebei Provincial Assembly and 
the Hebei Administrative Council, showing an expansion of organized CCP political influence 
into central China within two years of the establishment of its original Border region.92 The CCP 
continued its expansion southward throughout the 1940s, gaining the support of millions of 
Chinese peasants and local gentry. By April 1945, CCP membership totaled more than 1.2 
million with a population of 95.5 million under the influence of communist-led local 
governments.93 
 The establishment of local governments in communist areas allowed the party to connect 
with the peasantry and implement a proposed form of government in stark contrast to that 
                                                
 90 Ibid., 120-143. 
 
 91 Mao Zedong, “Proclamation by the Government of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border 
Region and the Rear Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army,” May 15, 1938 in Selected Works 
of Mao Zedong, 127-128.  
 
 92 Mao Zedong, “New-Democratic Constitutional Government,” February 20, 1940 in 
Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 213-215.  
 
 93 Mao Zedong, “China’s Two Possible Destinies,” April 23, 1945 in Selected Works of 
Mao Zedong, 281-282. 
 41 
administered by the Guomindang. Unlike the increasingly dictatorial Guomindang, the CCP 
advocated expanded suffrage in areas under its control. In March 1940 Mao Zedong proclaimed, 
“Every Chinese who reaches the age of 18 and is in favor of resistance and democracy should 
enjoy the right to elect and to be elected, irrespective of class, nationality, sex, creed, party-
affiliation or educational level.”94 While compliance with the general platform of the CCP was a 
prerequisite for participation, such statements by the communist leader show clear efforts to 
engage the peasantry in government, politics, and resistance. United States Ambassador to China 
C.E. Gauss noted the benefits of increased participation for the communists, asserting that “all 
sections of the population give enthusiastic support to the war because of the self-government 
and political programs of the Border Governments.”95  
  While making great efforts to expand its influence, the CCP allowed non-party members 
to hold the majority of administrative positions in the local governments it organized. The CCP 
established governments under a system of thirds: one third of the leadership of a given region 
must be CCP members, one third must be non-party leftist progressives, and the remaining third 
must be moderate candidates (“neither left nor right”).  While ensuring that each government 
maintained substantial CCP influence, this policy contributed to the unity of the masses and 
prevented the alienation of non-party members in local politics. Mao Zedong emphasized the 
political benefits of the thirds policy, noting that allowing non-leftists to have a voice in 
government helped to rally communist support among the middle bourgeoisie and local gentry. 
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Mao also noted that the system of thirds was not set to rigid quotas but was established as a 
rough, proportional guide for localities to follow.96 While the policy allowed for non-CCP 
moderates and leftists to participate in government, the CCP restricted voices it viewed to be 
“rightist.” Traitors (including collaborationists) and anti-Communists (including Guomindang 
sympathizers) were firmly suppressed in communist areas. However, this intolerance for rightist 
dissent in spite of greater political participation may have been in reaction to Jiang Jieshi’s 
attempts to infiltrate communist areas with secret police.97  
 After winning support through increased participation and well-articulated messages of 
anti-Japanese resistance, the CCP slowly began introducing its Marxist agenda in the border 
regions. A number of socialist policies were implemented, geared to benefiting the peasantry. 
The workday in the border regions was set at ten hours with a goal to shorten it to eight hours. 
To promote greater equality, land rent was reduced by twenty-five percent and the poorest of 
peasants were exempted from paying taxes. Educational opportunities, facilitating the 
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dissemination of communist ideology, were made available through village schools and literacy 
groups.98  
 The economy in the border regions centered on agriculture. Soldiers were required to 
farm in between periods of training and fighting. When soldiers reportedly had difficulty farming 
in rough terrain, communist leaders enlisted the help of rural farmers to cooperate with the 
military in supplying food for army rations.99 Border regions were to work toward self-
sufficiency, with Mao proclaiming, “We must not depend on the outside at all.” Production was 
promoted not only in the established border regions, but also in loosely organized guerilla zones 
and other “liberated areas.”100  The CCP saw economic growth as key to the defeat of Japan and 
the end of China’s national subjugation.101  
 The war with Japan also allowed the CCP to implement economic policies that fostered 
popular support for the communists. Prior to the Japanese invasion, the rural peasantry had been 
nearly bankrupted by heavy taxation. Communist leaders in border regions abolished forty-two 
taxes enforced by previous regimes. The primary source of revenue for newly established local 
governments was an export tax on goods such as salt, wool, and hides. No taxes were levied on 
land. Instead, farmers were required to contribute to “National Salvation and Public Food 
Consumption,” a stockpile of food used for army rations and the self-sufficiency of border 
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regions. The farmer’s cooperation with this policy illustrated the CCP’s success with the 
peasantry; who voluntarily contributed fifty percent more than the required amount in 1939.102 
 
Increased Military Might 
 The Second Sino-Japanese War also had a significant impact on the communist military. 
CCP forces faced a number of unique challenges during its resistance of Japan in the 1930s-
1940s. Following the fall of Wuhan in 1941 and the retreat of nationalist forces into western 
China, guerilla forces and rural militia (organized by the CCP) became a primary threat to 
Japanese domination in central and eastern China.103  As communist-orchestrated attacks at the 
invader’s flanks and rear successfully weakened sections of the Japanese army in the early 
1940s, leading Tokyo radio stations began to proclaim that communist forces were the greatest 
enemy of Japan in China.104 In response, Japan focused a significant portion of its military 
efforts against CCP forces in the latter years of the war. The communist leadership noted this 
change in Japanese strategy, with Mao Zedong arguing that only thirty-six percent of Japanese 
troops and five percent of collaborationist troops were attacking Guomindang-controlled areas, 
while communist forces endured the majority of Japanese attacks.105 Other sources confirm 
significant challenges for the communists due to Japan’s targeting of rural areas, with journalist 
Robert Forman reporting, 
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 The Eight Route and New Fourth Armies together represent something less than one-fifth 
 of the total Chinese forces facing the Japanese. These Communist troops, however, 
 engage 49.5 percent of all the Japanese forces in China today, as well as over 90 percent 
 of nearly 800,000 puppets. 106 
 
Through a series of “mopping-up campaigns,” the Japanese army orchestrated violent attacks 
against the rural population of central and eastern China, hoping to eliminate residual resistance 
in areas behind Japanese lines.107  
 In addition to enduring increasingly frequent Japanese attacks, the communist army and 
militia also faced significant challenges as a result of the CCP’s strained relationship with the 
Guomindang, who retained control of the internationally recognized government of the Republic 
of China. On January 17, 1941, Jiang Jieshi ordered that the CCP’s New Fourth Army be 
incorporated into the Guomindang army and that command be consolidated under Guomidang 
generals. The CCP rejected this order as counterrevolutionary, claiming that Jiang Jieshi had 
presented an unreasonable demand of unilateral submission. In an attempt to bring the rebellious 
communist forces under his control, Jiang Jieshi ordered the New Fourth Army to cross the 
Chang Jiang, leading CCP forces into an ambush. With nearly eighty thousand troops, the 
Guomindang attacked the New Fourth Army, orchestrating an eight-day massacre that resulted in 
the deaths of more than five thousand communist soldiers and the capture of the CCP General 
Yeh Ting.108 The event, referred to as the New Fourth Army Incident or Southern Anhui 
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Incident, brought an official end to the fragile alliance between the CCP and Guomindang. As 
part of Jiang’s blockade of communist areas in northern China, the CCP stopped receiving 
foreign aid from the central government in Chongqing, forcing the communist-led resistance to 
be primarily self-sufficient. The self-sufficiency of communist areas became increasingly crucial 
when the Chinese communists stopped receiving aid from the Soviet Union in 1943.109   
 Despite these challenges, the CCP managed to increase drastically its military might 
during the Second Sino-Japanese War.  This was largely due to the communists’ nontraditional 
approach to warfare. While the Guomindang maintained a more conventional military approach 
of conscripting and training full-time soldiers, the CCP armed citizens in territories under its 
influence and organized the peasantry into militias. Philosophies of communist resistance 
focused on total mobilization, in contrast to the Guomindang’s approach of resistance by 
government alone. The Guomindang criticized the CCP’s policy of arming rural populations, 
with Jiang Jieshi stating, “When we reach the point where the whole nation must take up arms, 
then we know we shall have to sacrifice to the very end without the slightest hope of avoiding 
suffering by some sudden turn of fortune.”110 
                                                
Zedong, 222-223; see also Snow, Battle for Asia, 169-171; C.E. Gauss, “The Ambassador in 
China to the Secretary of State,” November 20, 1943 in Foreign Relations of the United States: 
Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), 280-281. 
 
 109 While many sources are unclear as to the precise motivation behind this shift in Soviet 
policy, American diplomats suspected the flow of Soviet aid to the Chinese communists was 
hindered by increased Guomindang presence in western provinces (especially Xinjiang); see 
William Harrison Standley, “The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State,” 
July 20, 1943 in Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, China 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954); see also Dong Biwu, Memorandum on 
China’s Liberated Areas, 7-8. 
 
 110 Jiang Jieshi, “A Turning Point in our Struggle,” in Resistance and Reconstruction: 
Messages During China’s Six Years of War 1937-1943 (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries 
Press, 1943) 52.  
 47 
 Despite the opposing philosophy of the Guomindang government, the CCP slogan, as 
articulated in 1937, was “total resistance by the whole nation.” Mao Zedong proclaimed,  “A war 
of partial resistance by the government alone without the mass participation of the people will 
certainly fail.”111 Thus, resistance in the Border regions required the involvement of virtually the 
entire population. This strategy extended beyond direct combat, with farmers producing food for 
army rations while women organized knitting groups that provided blankets and clothes for 
soldiers.112  
 The CCP strategy also differed from that of its enemies in that it incorporated a greater 
understanding of the unique needs and conditions of China. Unlike Japan, China was a vast and 
backward country, with limited technological means and large amounts of territory. The CCP 
utilized such conditions to its advantage, engaging in mobile warfare to out-maneuver the larger, 
Japanese army, which had less understanding of Chinese topography.113 Geography became a 
central consideration in CCP strategy, with specific scenarios outlined for guerilla warfare in the 
mountains, plains, and river valleys of rural China. In contrast to the Japanese, the CCP also took 
prisoners of war, treated them humanely, and used them to gain strategic information about the 
enemy. 114 
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 Due to the mobile nature of guerilla warfare, the lack of heavy arms and equipment 
proved advantageous to communist-led militia in various regions. Tanks and armored vehicles 
slowed CCP mobility and were useless due to the fact that the CCP had no access to the fuel and 
spare parts necessary to operate and maintain such vehicles. To prevent other enemy forces from 
using abandoned arms, most CCP militia groups burned or destroyed the military equipment they 
confiscated. An exception to this general pattern of CCP strategy toward arms and equipment is 
the New Fourth Army in eastern and southern China. The New Fourth Army was the most well 
equipped CCP resistance force, due to its proximity to collaborationist governments, who were 
supplied with arms by the Japanese army. The New Fourth Army was often able to steal arms 
and other equipment from Japanese and collaborationist regimes in surrounding areas.115 
 The Japanese invasion also gave the CCP the opportunity to reconnect with loyal soldiers 
left behind during the Long March. Nearly 30,000 communist troops were left behind in Jiangxi 
to cover the rear of the CCP’s retreat into the north in 1934. While the Guomindang claimed to 
have eliminated communist resistance in the region, a number of CCP members and supporters 
retreated into the surrounding mountains, where they remained until the westward retreat of the 
Guomindang in 1937.  With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the surviving communist 
soldiers were organized under General Han Ying into militia that carried out guerilla attacks on 
the Japanese in southern provinces, including Hubei, Anhui, Zheijiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, 
Guangdong and Guangxi. Isolated from the primary CCP base in northern Shaanxi, these attacks 
were originally orchestrated blindly, with General Han Ying having no contact with CCP 
leadership in Yan’an until late 1937. These residual militia groups helped to re-establish 
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communist presence in the south, complementing the CCP’s northern expansion from Shaanxi. 
Han Ying’s forces were eventually consolidated with the New Fourth Army, which continued 
military operations throughout central and southern China into the 1940s.116 
 By the end of the war with Japan, the CCP maintained significant military presence 
throughout eastern China in three major geographic areas. The Eighth Route Army remained 
primarily in northern China, centered on the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border region. The New 
Fourth Army fought mainly in central China, surrounding Anhui Province. Remnant forces left 
behind after the Long March maintained a significant communist presence in southern provinces, 
including Jiangxi. By 1945, communist forces included more than 910,000 soldiers, with another 
2.2 million in the militia.117 The CCP’s strong military presence in various regions during the 
Japanese invasion left the communists poised for victory against the Guomindang after Japan’s 
withdraw. 
 Japan’s occupation of China throughout the 1930s and 1940s virtually eliminated the 
nationalist party’s presence in the east, allowing for the expansion of the Chinese communists. 
The communists seized the opportunity afforded them by the Sino-Japanese War to introduce the 
peasantry to a revolutionary form of government that emphasized political participation and 
equality.  This radically different approach to government, combined with the CCP’s successes 
in resisting the Japanese, won legitimacy and popular support for the communists, allowing them 
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to greatly increase their military might through voluntary militia, while the Guomindang was 
forced to rely heavily on conscription.118  
 While CCP total membership was reduced to a mere four thousand at the time of the 
Japanese invasion, the communists by the defeat of Japan in 1945 were in control of a population 
comparable to that of the United States at the time. Noting the significant expansion of the 
CCP’s territory, influence and military as a result of the Sino-Japanese War, multiple observers, 
including journalists, foreign diplomats, and Mao Zedong himself, accurately predicted the 
CCP’s eventual dominance of the Chinese mainland.119 Beyond the strategic advantages it 
afforded the CCP, the Second Sino-Japanese War also gave the CCP access to the peasantry, 
which greatly aided the communists’ ability to lead an organic, rural-based nationalist 
movement. This proved to be perhaps the most significant factor in the CCP’s ultimate victory 
over the Guomindang in 1949. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
PEASANT NATIONALISM REVISITED 
 
 The ideology of the Chinese communist leader, Mao Zedong, differed from that of earlier 
communist revolutionaries elsewhere in that it placed significant emphasis on the role of the 
rural peasant. In the 1930s, China had experienced very limited industrialization, resulting in an 
exceptionally small class of industrial workers, with poor, rural farmers accounting for nearly 
eighty percent of the total population. Unlike Marxism or Leninism, Maoism called for a social 
revolution that redistributed wealth and property to the peasantry rather than advocating the rise 
of the urban, industrial proletariat. Thus, Mao called for a sinification of Marxism, emphasizing 
the practice of Marxist theory as it applied to the Chinese case. Communist theory and ideology 
were amended to bring about immediate social change in China, as Mao rejected the tendency of 
some intellectuals to revere the ideas of Marx and Lenin as dogma. Instead, Mao emphasized the 
usefulness of communist ideology in the mobilization of the masses, passionately asserting, 
 Our comrades must understand that we do not study Marxism-Leninism because it is 
 pleasing to the eye, nor because it has some mystical value…It is only extremely useful.  
 …This is a type of childish blindness, and we must start a movement to enlighten these 
 people…Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin have repeatedly said, “Our doctrine is not 
 dogma; it is a guide to action.”120 
 
  As Mao rose to prominence in the latter years of the Jiangxi Soviet, his ideas of a rural-
based revolution became more prominent in CCP philosophy than the urban model of Lenin. As 
other communist thinkers, such as Chen Boda and Zhou Yang, contributed to Mao’s 
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revolutionary philosophy, the CCP targeted the vast, rural population with its message of social 
revolution. Prior to the Long March, communist areas in the south enacted a number of policies 
aimed at empowering the peasantry, such as equitable taxation, lower interest rates and reduced 
land rent.121 Although these policies served to articulate and demonstrate the attitude of the CCP 
toward the peasantry, they failed to achieve the party’s ultimate goal of mass peasant 
mobilization prior to the Japanese invasion. 
 In Mao’s 1938 essay, “On Protracted War,” the communist leader argued that the unity of 
the Chinese people was the most important condition of victory and noted unsuccessful attempts 
at peasant mobilization prior to the war against Japan.122 Earlier nationalist movements in China, 
such as the Xinhai Revolution or the May Fourth Movement,123 were orchestrated by educated, 
urban elites, a class that accounted for a very small percentage of the total Chinese population. 
Prior to the outbreak of war in 1937, peasants throughout China based their identity more on ties 
to local villages than to an abstract, unstable concept of a modern Chinese nation, creating a 
nationalist movement that was “a head with no body.”124 In the late 1930s, the invading Japanese 
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army brought the politics of national identity to the countryside, enabling the communists to 
achieve mass mobilization. 
 
Theories of Modern Nationalism 
 In his 1962 work, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, Chalmers Johnson argued 
that the Maoist version of Marxist ideology provided a national myth125 for an anti-Japanese 
movement among the Chinese peasantry. Johnson asserted that the Chinese communist 
revolution was in fact a nationalist movement, uniting and mobilizing the masses against 
domestic and foreign oppression. Johnson’s thesis is supported by the apparent shift in CCP 
propaganda, during the period of the Second Sino-Japanese War, from Marxist messages of class 
warfare to those calling for national salvation. According to Johnson, economic incentives did 
not provide sufficient motivation for revolution among the peasantry prior to the Japanese 
invasion. Since the invading Japanese army did not distinguish between villagers and guerilla 
fighters, the entire, rural Chinese population endured violent attacks.126  The actions of the 
Japanese in the late 1930s aroused parochial villagers and sparked a peasant movement, later 
harnessed by the CCP. Johnson argued that communist ideology fostered the desire to create a 
powerful, united, and independent China.127 
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 Since Johnson’s early work on peasant nationalism, a number of other scholars have 
given significant attention to the development of mass nationalist movements in the twentieth 
century. In 1983 and 1991, Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson presented two works that 
remain key elements of the theoretical framework for the study of contemporary nationalism. In 
his work Nations and Nationalism, Gellner argued that as European states shifted from agrarian 
to industrial societies, increased mobility created a need for homogeneity that fostered the rise of 
modern nationalism. Expounding upon the ideas of Elie Kedourie,128 Gellner attempted to apply 
western models of nationalism globally, arguing that the imperialist destruction of traditional 
cultures created a need for a new homogeneity in the developing world, similar to that 
experienced in Europe as a result of industrialization.129 In his discussion of colonial Africa, 
Gellner suggested that the administrative policies of colonial powers fostered a union of the 
oppressed peoples of a given territory based on shared limitations rather than on a shared 
culture.130 
 In contrast to Gellner, Benedict Anderson131 took a less Eurocentric approach, arguing 
that modern nationalism began in the late eighteenth century in the Americas and was later 
exported, via Europe, to Asia and Africa. According to Anderson, nationalism first emerged 
through a shared sphere of communication among creoles in the new world. In the eighteenth 
century, a print revolution in the Americas produced a significant number of provincial 
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newspapers read primarily by creoles and avoided by European officials. Anderson argued that 
these spheres of communication shaped the current borders of nations throughout the Americas. 
Anderson’s work also emphasized the significance of pilgrimage in the development of modern 
nationalism in Asia and Africa. Shared educational and administrative paths (often dictated by 
colonial rulers) among individuals from various towns or cities fostered the development of an 
“imagined community,” centered on the destination of these pilgrimages.132 
 While Johnson’s revolutionary work illustrated the significance of Japanese imperialism 
in the development of the modern Chinese nation, scholars have yet to discuss in adequate detail 
the ways in which this process occurred. Decades after Johnson, Gellner and Anderson gave 
greater insight into the rise of modern nations, noting patterns of common limitations, shared 
spheres of communication, and pilgrimage in Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia and Africa. 
Expounding upon the ideas of Johnson, and using the theoretical framework established by 
Gellner and Anderson, this chapter seeks to examine the specific ways in which the communist 
party achieved mass mobilization in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Chinese 
Communist Party unified and mobilized the masses for revolution by fostering shared spheres of 
communication, creating administrative and educational pilgrimages centered on Yan’an, and 
educating the masses of their shared limitations. 
 
Spheres of Communication 
 As in the case of American creoles in the eighteenth century, printed publications played 
a key role in the development of a shared sphere of communication among the Chinese masses 
                                                
 132 Anderson elaborated in detail about the role of pilgrimage in the formation of 
“imagined communities,” citing examples in New Spain, French Indochina, and the Dutch East 
Indies; see Anderson, Imagined Communities, 53-60; 116-123; 127-129.  
 56 
and communist leaders in the 1930s-1940s. Mao Zedong emphasized the importance of print in 
CCP strategy at the Yan’an Forum of Literature and Art in May 1942, when he proclaimed, 
In our struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people there are various fronts,   
among which there are the fronts of the pen and of the gun, the cultural and the 
 military fronts. To defeat the enemy we must rely primarily on the army with   
guns. But this army alone is not enough; we must also have a cultural army,   
which is absolutely indispensable for uniting our own ranks and defeating the 
 enemy…133 
 
Each division of the CCP army traveled with a small printing press and disseminated communist 
literature and propaganda to the masses throughout the mainland.134 As communist territory and 
influence expanded in eastern China, messages from Yan’an were delivered to the masses via 
communist newspapers, such as the Liberation Daily (Jiefang Ribao).135 
 The Liberation Daily, the official newspaper of the communist party, began publication 
in Yan’an in 1941. Collaborationist regimes in urban areas such as Nanjing, Beijing, and 
Shanghai banned the newspaper due to its explicit anti-Japanese messages, limiting the 
Liberation Daily’s audience to farmers and local gentry in rural areas.136  Jiang Jieshi’s strict 
blockade of traffic between communist territory and western areas under Guomindang control 
further limited the readership of the Liberation Daily to central and eastern China.137  Thus, the 
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Liberation Daily became the primary source of news and information for the demographic 
constituting the majority of the Chinese population: rural peasants in the east. The newspaper 
became a direct avenue of communication between Yan’an and the Chinese masses, fostering a 
grassroots movement against foreign imperialism and capitalist oppression. 
 While written articles in the Liberation Daily provided an effective means of 
communication with the relatively educated local gentry,138 the CCP encountered significant 
challenges when using the written word to address the millions of illiterate peasants found in 
communist controlled areas.139 In response, the CCP adopted an official policy of eliminating 
illiteracy. In a 1936 letter to future defense minister Lin Biao, Mao stressed the importance of 
literacy campaigns among the peasantry, specifically noting the importance of the peasantry’s 
ability to read newspapers.140 As part of Mao’s eleven-point plan for national salvation, two 
thirds of the curriculum used in primary and secondary schools focused on literacy, with each 
peasant charged with learning at least one thousand characters. In addition to combating 
illiteracy, peasants in villages throughout China participated in CCP organized newspaper 
reading groups, making the delivery of communist messages a shared activity, further 
contributing to the unity of the masses.141 
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 To appeal to its largely illiterate audience, the CCP distributed publications that often 
included vivid colors and graphics,142 as well as significant numbers of cartoons. These images, 
often accompanied by a short phrase of a few written characters, comically displayed the party’s 
attitude toward current events and political figures. These graphics also served to shape the 
uninformed public’s opinion on various aspects of China’s domestic and international conflicts. 
Most notably, the cartoons published in the Liberation Daily contributed to the shared contempt 
of the masses for Japan, Germany, and the Guomindang. In 1943, the CCP began an aggressive 
anti-Guomindang campaign in the Liberation Daily, including a number of cartoons connecting 
Jiang Jieshi with Nazi Germany and Japan. In many of these cartoons, Jiang is portrayed as an 
ignorant puppet of foreign imperialists, falsely claiming to support peace while secretly fueling 
conflict.143 
 The CCP also took a more creative approach to communicating with the illiterate masses. 
To effectively communicate with their peasant audience, the CCP organized troupes of actors 
and commissioned them with conveying newspaper content in a theatrical manner. Presented in 
the dramatic yang ge style of poem and song, “living newspapers” delivered news and 
propaganda to the peasantry throughout communist China.144 These performances included 
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pieces referring to Germany, France and America, connecting the previously isolated peasantry 
with distant lands and forcing local villagers to renegotiate their perceived identity in a larger, 
global context.145 Using emotionally evocative language and imagery to depict Japanese brutality 
in neighboring provinces, living newspapers were also used to instill hatred of the Japanese 
among peasants, militia, and soldiers. Multiple sources note a repeated village drama depicting 
the horror of Japanese invasion.146 In addition to local actors, traveling drama troupes from 
Yan’an performed the same pieces in multiple villages, allowing for uniform messages that 
contributed to a sense of community among the Chinese peasantry.147 
 
Pilgrimage 
 In addition to fostering unity among the peasants through shared channels of 
communication, the CCP also established paths of educational and administrative pilgrimage for 
peasants from various villages, centered on the wartime communist capital, Yan’an. Isolated 
from urban collaborationist governments and blockaded by the Guomindang in the west, many 
peasants regarded Yan’an as the seat of central government during the war. Cut off from 
traditional universities in Beijing or Kunming, Yan’an also became the only large center of 
learning in communist areas during the Second Sino-Japanese War.148  
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 The CCP’s aggressive campaign to educate the rural masses established a system of 
higher learning, made available to villagers throughout rural China. In a speech given in October 
1938, Mao asserted, “all party members should study . . . and help to educate members with less 
schooling.” 149 In a later speech given October 30, 1944, Mao reaffirmed the CCP’s commitment 
to education, proclaiming that a “dull-witted army cannot defeat the enemy.” During the period 
of the Second Sino-Japanese War, peasants in areas under CCP influence benefited from the 
establishment of primary and secondary schools, irregular village schools for adults, and literacy 
classes.150 According to foreign observers, each village in communist China included one day 
and one night school, facilitating the education of both youth and adults. As early as 1939, 
communist areas had more than 860 primary and secondary schools, 208 night schools for adults, 
and more than 700 character study literacy groups. CCP education measures also established 
mobile, circuit schools for peasants living in the most rural areas, and offered academic lessons 
in the fields to prevent any interference with subsistence farming. 151  
 American journalist Harrison Forman noted the impact of education reforms for the 
peasantry in his account of a local election in a village located two hours’ walk from Yan’an. 
According to Forman, a candidate for local office “added that he thought his fellow villagers 
ought to put special emphasis on education. This was a new world they were living in–a world 
that reached beyond their little village limits, and they and their children should prepare 
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themselves for greater responsibilities.”152 The statements reportedly made by this peasant in 
Shaanxi province illustrate the significance of education in the renegotiating of identity for rural 
peasants in 1940s China. Faced with the reality of international conflict and educated by the 
CCP, peasants eventually came to view themselves as members of a larger community of 
Chinese nationals, rather than isolated villagers. 
 Collective pilgrimages to the Anti-Japanese Resistance Military and Political University 
(Kangda) in Yan’an further facilitated the imagining of a shared community among the Chinese 
masses.  Sitting atop the communist educational system, the university was attended by peasant 
and “petty bourgeoisie” youth from throughout communist China.  At the university in Yan’an, 
rural villagers were taught Marxist theory, establishing an ideological foundation for the 
forthcoming revolution. Kangda graduated approximately 10,000 students per year in the 1940s. 
All students able to make the treacherous pilgrimage to Yan’an were given free tuition, asked 
only to provide their own uniforms and bedding.153  
 Student pilgrimages to Yan’an were notoriously dangerous and difficult. Jiang Jieshi’s 
blockade of CCP controlled areas prevented many students from reaching the communist capital. 
Many students who encountered Guomindang soldiers were forced to return home or taken to 
General Hu Zongnan’s reform school, the nationalist army’s counterpart to Kangda. Referred to 
as a concentration camp by CCP leadership, General Hu’s reform school pressured students to 
renounce communism and work for the Guomindang army.154 
  Despite significant challenges, thousands of youth from central and eastern China 
traveled to Yan’an for communist education. According to foreign observers, countless others 
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considered such pilgrimages, asking how they might enter schools in Yan’an. The famous 
Chinese writer Lu Xun proclaimed, “The road to Yan’an is for China’s youth the road to life.”155 
Repeated mention of educational pilgrimages to Yan’an in popular discourse and contemporary 
literature suggests the significance of Yan’an as a symbol of the newly imagined community of 
the Chinese masses. Shared connections to Yan’an, through experienced pilgrimage, or tales of 
pilgrimage from friends, family and literature, made the wartime communist capital the center of 
emerging Chinese mass nationalism. 
 During the era of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP also sought to establish 
Yan’an as the seat of central government for portions of the population under communist 
influence. As the communists consolidated power behind Japanese lines, officials from Yan’an 
organized local governments in villages throughout central and eastern China. The organizational 
structure of these governments reserved certain positions for peasants, workers, and minority 
groups.156  Mirroring the structure of local governing bodies, committees in the central party 
leadership also reserved positions for workers and poor peasants.157 The CCP’s appointment of 
peasants to administrative positions at various levels of party leadership parallels Anderson’s 
description of administrative pilgrimage in French Indochina.158 According to Anderson, 
limitations placed on administrative pilgrimage in the French colony resulted in the breakup of 
Indochina into three separate nations: Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In contrast to the French in 
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Indochina, the CCP incorporated individuals of various classes from different provinces into 
party leadership, thereby facilitating the emergence of a single, united, nationalist movement. 
 
Shared Oppression 
 In addition to creating spheres of communication and shared pilgrimages, the Japanese 
invasion facilitated the rural population’s awareness of its shared oppression. As Mao Zedong 
stated in an interview with British journalist James Bertram, “. . . the Japanese imperialists have 
irrevocably brought the Chinese people face to face with the danger of national subjugation.”159 
As the Japanese army forced its way inland, soldiers raped and killed hundreds of thousands of 
rural Chinese. As Johnson noted in his discussion of rural “mopping up campaigns,” such 
demonstrations of brutality compelled the peasantry to take action, proving to be the ultimate 
motivating factor in the mobilization of the rural masses.160 Beyond Johnson’s initial 
understanding of the significance of Japanese brutality, it is essential to note that the 
victimization of the rural population was a shared experience, having not only the power to spark 
retaliatory violence, but to unify isolated villagers through their common suffering. 
 Tales of Japanese brutality were circulated throughout communist China in a variety of 
ways. Accounts of suffering in neighboring provinces were featured in communist publications, 
such as the Liberation Daily, and also became an integral part of CCP military training. 
Communist soldiers were taught the history of Japanese aggression (beginning with the First 
Sino-Japanese War of 1895) and taken to pillaged villages to witness firsthand the destruction 
brought about by the Japanese. At these villages, soldiers and militia encountered survivors who 
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relayed stories of Japanese atrocities. While in communist China, journalist Harrison Forman 
accompanied communist soldiers to a raided village in Shaanxi. According to local villagers,  
 . . . a raiding party of Japs carried off truckloads of women whom they violated 
 unspeakably. Many were killed for resisting; others, horribly mutilated. Some 
 became permanently deranged. Of those who straggled back to the village many 
 committed suicide.161  
 
The mobilizing power of Japanese brutality is evidenced by the fact that the CCP was able to 
build a large army comprised solely of volunteers, in contrast to the smaller Guomindang army 
built through conscription.162  
 In similar fashion, the CCP emphasized the shared limitations of the masses under Jiang 
Jieshi’s government in order to mobilize resistance against the Guomindang in the years leading 
up to the civil war (1946-1949). As the nationalist government in Chongqing grew increasingly 
weak politically and economically, Guomindang authorities fought for survival by silencing 
opposition and imposing heavy taxes on those living under their control. The U.S. Ambassador 
to China, C.E. Gauss, reported that Sanyuan, a village just north of Xi’an in Shaanxi, rejected the 
authority of the nationalist government due to the imposition of heavy grain taxes on poor 
farmers. Gauss also added, “a continuation of the present practices of the officials is likely to 
result in the peasants’ welcoming the communists, who went to great efforts to conciliate the 
populace.”163 In August 1938, the Guomindang demonstrated its intolerance for dissent as three 
mass organizations sponsored by the CCP were outlawed. One of the few organs of government 
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permitting political participation under the Guomindang, the National Assembly, did not 
convene during the war with Japan.164   
 Presenting a stark alternative to the increasingly authoritarian attitudes of the 
Guomindang, the CCP emphasized peasant participation in government. The CCP organized 
elections for local offices in various villages with supervisory committees consisting of farmers, 
workers, and teachers. Other leadership organizations, such as the Border Regions’ People’s 
Political Council, included members from various backgrounds, including peasants, intellectuals, 
and soldiers.165 The communist leader, Lin Biao, praised such reforms, claiming that elected 
officials held all administrative seats in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia border region.166 
 The CCP also emphasized shared limitations by appealing to traditionally oppressed 
groups such as youth, women, and minorities. In addition to Kangda, Yan’an was also home to a 
women’s university. Most of the four hundred students came from peasant backgrounds in 
Japanese occupied territories.167 An article written by Lin Biao in 1940 illustrated the CCP’s 
focus on women and youth. In areas where communist troops were stationed, young people 
distributed literature for the soldiers and women worked as nurses.  According to Lin, some 
women even volunteered to fight and were given military training.  In addition to appeals to 
youth and women, the CCP pandered to ethnic minorities. A number of positions in local 
governments were reserved for minority groups, such as Mongols or Hui Muslims in the north. 
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The CCP’s emphasis on the universal oppression of the Chinese masses, presented as similar to 
the Guomindang oppression of the CCP, proved a powerful method of uniting the population and 
fueling “peasant nationalism.”168 
 
Conclusion 
 It is impossible to prove precisely when the shift from local identity to national identity 
occurred in the minds of Chinese peasantry. No written accounts exist from the peasants 
themselves since the masses were largely illiterate at the onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War. 
In the words of Eric Hobsbawm, 
 We know too little about what went on, or for that matter still goes on, in the   
 minds of most relatively inarticulate men and women, to speak with confidence   
 about their thoughts and feelings toward nationalities and nation-states which   
 claim their loyalties.169 
 
Similar to trends observed elsewhere in the twentieth century, available sources suggest that 
spheres of communication, educational and administrative pilgrimages, and shared experiences 
of oppression assisted the CCP in its ultimate goal of mass mobilization in China.   
 During the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP, as directed by Mao Zedong, initiated a 
social revolution that contributed to the development of authentic, mass nationalism on the 
Chinese mainland. While the Japanese invasion weakened the Guomindang and provided 
strategic military benefit to the CCP, perhaps the war with Japan was most significant in that it 
made the peasantry receptive to the CCP’s message of revolution. Plagued by Japanese brutality 
and the failure of the nationalist government to appropriately respond, the peasantry was 
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compelled to acknowledge the necessity for revolution. Building upon the foundation laid by 
Japan, the CCP seized the opportunity for mass mobilization, fostering the rise of nationalist 
sentiment through communication, pilgrimage, and participation.   
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CONCLUSION: 
 
THE BIRTH OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
 
 
 
 The impact of Japan’s occupation of China became increasingly evident following the 
defeat of Japan by the allied powers in 1945. More than 1.5 million Chinese died as a direct 
result of the Japanese invasion. During its occupation of China, the Japanese army had served as 
a buffer between the communists and the nationalists. The Second Sino-Japanese War 
interrupted the power struggle between these domestic foes, allowing only for minor clashes 
between the two rivals, including the New Fourth Army’s ambush in Southern Anhui and Jiang 
Jieshi’s attempts to attack communist areas through the use of secret police. During Japan’s 
occupation of China, the communists recovered from their near defeat of the mid-1930s while 
the Guomindang government decayed as a result of its political and economic isolation. When 
direct, armed conflict between the two political parties resumed in 1946, the Guomindang army 
lay in ruins while the stronger, popularly supported CCP stood poised for victory.170 
  Though Japan announced its intent to surrender a mere four days after the U.S. 
bombing of Hiroshima (August 6, 1945), the Japanese army in China formally surrendered to the 
government of the Republic of China on September 9, 1945 in Nanjing. Although the formal 
agreement was presented to Guomindang general Ho Ying Ch’in and specified the surrender of 
Japanese troops to the Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi, the CCP’s established dominance behind 
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Japanese lines enabled the communists to negotiate local surrenders and disarm a number of 
Japanese units throughout the provinces.171 
 The Japanese invasion had allowed the communists to establish bases in central and 
eastern China while isolating the Guomindang in the west. Due to its proximity to areas recently 
controlled by Japan, the CCP was able to quickly acquire large amounts of arms and territory as 
Japanese forces surrendered and withdrew. Immediately following the Japanese surrender, the 
communists expanded northward into Manchuria, aided by the ideologically similar Soviets that 
had disarmed the Japanese in the region.  The communist military leader Lin Biao began 
organizing soldiers of the failed Japanese puppet state of Manzhouguo under CCP leadership, 
significantly increasing communist military might in the north.172  
 While the Guomindang also sent military leaders to the north and east, their efforts were 
unsuccessful. The distance between Guomindang-controlled areas and Japanese strongholds in 
the east delayed the nationalists’ arrival to these areas after the Japanese surrender. By the time 
Guomindang military officials reached the region, communist influence and military presence 
were well established. In response to growing communist dominance over Manchuria, Jiang 
Jieshi sent significant numbers of nationalist troops to the north. This move proved futile as the 
Guomindang forces sent to Manchuria had been fighting against the Japanese to secure supply 
routes to nationalist China through Burma and Indochina to the far south. This distance further 
delayed the Guomindang’s arrival in northeast China, illustrating yet another way in which the 
war with Japan gave a significant advantage to the Chinese communists.173 
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  The increasingly dictatorial tendencies of the Guomindang regime in the mid-1940s also 
negatively impacted its ability to gain legitimacy among citizens and soldiers in territories 
previously controlled by the Japanese. In January 1946, the Guomindang outlawed the CCP and 
attempted to re-establish military rule over the Chinese mainland. Peasants, grown accustomed to 
the more democratic policies instituted in communist-led local governments, rejected Jiang’s 
dictatorship, further cementing the masses’ support of the communists. The Guomindang treated 
the Chinese soldiers of fallen collaborationist governments exceptionally harsh, leading many to 
defect and support the CCP who emphasized unity and equality. As Jiang Jieshi struggled to 
regain control of the eastern coastal areas where his power had once been strongest, his political 
capital and limited military means proved unable to compete with the communist-led nationalist 
movement that had begun in the countryside during the war with Japan.174 
 Despite the blatant frustration of American diplomats and President Truman with Jiang 
Jieshi’s ineptitude in the mid-1940s, the United States government continued its financial and 
military support of the Guomindang throughout the Chinese Civil War. Recognizing the gravity 
of the Guomindang’s plight by the spring of 1946, American diplomats in China pressured Jiang 
to negotiate a “third united front” with the CCP. The Chinese communists, however, had grown 
dramatically in the months since Japan’s surrender and were no longer willing to compromise 
with the unpopular Guomindang. In July 1946, Mao Zedong announced the creation of the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which included the former New Fourth and Eighth Route 
Armies, as well as large numbers of soldiers from Manzhouguo and fallen Japanese 
collaborationist regimes. With the amalgamation of its militia, armies, and newly acquired troops 
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into one organized military machine, the CCP had become an insurmountable threat to the 
Guomindang government.175 
 From 1947 to 1949, the communists continued to establish their dominance of China, 
expanding from their bases in the north and east. Through channels established during the Sino-
Japanese War (including newspapers, schools, literacy groups, and other mass organizations) the 
CCP maintained communication with the masses, clearly articulating its agenda and cementing 
the unity of the Chinese population through the shared experience of its struggle against 
Guomindang militarism.176 The Guomindang’s ties to the United States proved to be to its 
detriment, as communist leaders highlighted the relationship as proof that Jiang Jieshi was allied 
with foreign imperialists seeking, once again, to subjugate the Chinese people.177 While the CCP 
prevented inflation in areas under its control by issuing food and small luxuries directly to 
soldiers in lieu of payment, the communists cut off food supply routes to Guomindang areas, 
exacerbating the economic plight of the nationalist party. By January of 1949, the CCP 
controlled all of China north of the Chang Jiang. 178 
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 Forced to acknowledge the military might and popularity of the CCP, the Guomindang 
began negotiations toward a peace agreement in the spring of 1949 while secretly sending arms, 
troops, and the majority of its treasury to the island of Taiwan. After reaching an agreement with 
the communists that faulted the Guomindang for the Civil War and accepted the establishment of 
a coalition government, Jiang Jieshi ultimately rejected the Agreement on Internal Peace on 
April 15, 1949, to the outrage of the Chinese communists. On April 21, 1949, Mao Zedong and 
Zhu De issued a resolution ordering the PLA to, 
 Advance bravely and annihilate resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely all the 
 Guomindang reactionaries within China’s borders who dare to resist. Liberate the  people 
 of the whole country. Safeguard the independence and integrity of China’s 
 territory and  sovereignty.179 
 
At midnight on April 20, PLA soldiers crossed the Chang Jiang, moving south into the last 
stronghold of the Guomindang. In four days, the CCP took Nanjing, the Guomindang capital. As 
Guomindang forces throughout the south defected to the CCP, the communists gained control of 
the southeastern provinces of Guangxi and Guangdong. By late summer, all those loyal to Jiang 
Jieshi had fled the mainland for Taiwan.180 In October 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the 
foundation of the People’s Republic from the new communist capital in Beijing.181 
 While various factors contributed to the CCP’s ultimate victory in its twenty-eight year 
struggle against the Guomindang, the Second Sino-Japanese War proved to be the most 
significant factor leading to the establishment of a communist state on the Chinese mainland. 
Despite the intervention of other foreign powers, such as the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., Japan’s 
imperialist expansion had a far greater impact on the political landscape of modern China. 
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Though a number of scholars have emphasized the missteps of the Guomindang and the 
successful policies of the CCP, these factors would not have had significant impact without the 
Japanese invasion that weakened the Guomindang and allowed for the expansion of the CCP. 
Furthermore, the Japanese invasion was significant in that it brought about a shift in the identity 
of the Chinese people. The shared experience of Japanese brutality, and the necessity of 
resistance, fostered the development of a community among the rural masses throughout various 
provinces. As the peasantry came to identify themselves as part of a larger movement that 
extended beyond their local village or province, the CCP served to educate and mobilize the 
masses, facilitating the construction of a unique, “Chinese” identity. By Japan’s defeat, the CCP 
emerged as the clear leader of the newly imagined Chinese nation. After more than a century of 
conflict, revolution, and foreign domination, it was the Chinese Communist Party that ultimately 
established a unified and sovereign state in China. 
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